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The purpose of this thesis is to combine system reliability theory with observed equipment 
failures and maintenance costs in order to make better informed overhaul policy decisions for Manne 
Corps ground combat equipment'. Techniques currently used by the Army and USMC for computing 
the economic useful life of ground combat equipment assume a linear relationship betwen cost and 
age or usage (US Army TACOM, 1985). Systems reliability theory provides techniques for estimating 
linear and non-linear failure probabilities which can be used to predict how long equipment will last. 
Based on field data, we can compute the expected number of system failures over specified intervals, 
and associate expected costs with the failures to determine optimal maintenance policies and overhaul 
intervals. This thesis presents a model that is designed to give decision makers. such as the Integrated 
Logistic Support Directorate (ILSD), a more informed method for determining annd  depot level 
overhaul requirements based on the material condition of the equipment fleet and a reliability 
projection about its remaining useful life. The approach uses existing equipment historical 
maintenance data which is readily available through the Maintenance Data Analysis Center, Marine 
Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia, together with the II" Research Institute, Rome, New York 
B. BACKGROUND 
In many instances, it has been shown that rebuilding principal end items of equipment (PELS) 
costs much less than buying new. For example, during 1986, the Marine Corps Depot Maintenance 
Activities rebuilt M60A3 battle tanks at a unit cost of $186,000 as opposed to the acquisition cost of 
appoxirnately $1.3 million @oak, 1988). ?he decision when to overhaul equipment is made using 
a break-even analysis of the basic cash flow alternatives, namely; 1) "do-nothing," meaning continue 
to perform field level, or "minimal" repairs when the system fails, 2) overhaul, or 3) buy new. When 
the buy-new option is not a viable alternative due to program h d i n g  constraints, the issue of 
'The tern "overhaul" in this thesis implies both depot rebuild program$ and the "Inspect and Repair only As Neces~ary" 
(TROAN) concept. 
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overhaul intervals must be addressed. Optimal overhaul intervals are determined by minimizing the 
total expected cost of ownership over the life cycle of the system (Ascher and Feingold, 1984). 
Currently, overhadrebuild intervals for Marine Corps PEIs are recommended by the 
contractor during the system acquisition phase (Boak, 1988). While these design estimates are likely 
to be accurate, a companson based on actual equipment usage and maintenance data several years after 
the system has been in use may provide more meaningfid intervals (Blanchard, 1992). This 
comparison might be thought of as a check, or a "tracking signal," to the contractor's estimate. The 
time to overhaul based on system deterioration may be different than the initial estimates, and provide 
an opportunity for cost savings in overhaul programs. The techniques provided in this thesis give a 
quantitative "snapshot" of where a PEI is in its material life cycle, which is then used to predict future 
failure probabilities. Knowing the expected failure profile for a system policy decisions can be made 
about maintenance and overhaul intervals. 
The principal motivations for this thesis include: 
1. Ibe Need for Quality Information in Resome Allocation Decisions 
DoD is faced with downward budget trends, but must continue to maintain high levels of 
operational readiness to meet the conflicts crated by a turbulent world environment. In order to meet 
mission requirements, optimum use must be made of equipment resources, by applying analytic 
techniques to decision making and planning. Accurate information is needed to make cost-effective 
decisions abut maintenance policies. 
In some cases, it may not be economically desirable to replace low quantities of (repamble) 
equipment systems, due to excessive startup and production costs associated with low production 
quantities. In that situation, it may be more cost-effective to overhaul or "rebuild" the existing 
repairable systems (US Army TACOM, 1985). The decision when to overhadrebuild a repairable 
system is typically done using break-even analysis and Net-Present-Value ("V) Cash-Flow 
techniques (Blanchard, 1992). However, in order to conduct a meaningful NPV analysis, future 
expected costs are required. Much of the literature in overhaul/replace decision-making assume linear 
maintenance cost models as the system ages (Perry, 1967). For example, the US Army Tank and 
2 
Automotive Command (TACOM) has an extensive Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Useful Life 
Determination Program (TWVULDP) which recognizes that system reliability decreases with age 
(Implying that failure rates increase with age), however their maintenance cost model uses linear 
relationships. This thesis shows that the failure rate of deteriorating systems is not always linear, and 
provides an alternate approach to predict costs associated with expected failures. 
2. Jmpmved I\IIarine C o p  OverhauURebuild Planning Criteria 
The model presented in this thesis gives budget and program planners a way to characterize 
quantitatively the status of equipment in their life cycle using existing historical maintenance data. 
The Marine Corps uses several conflicting sources that provide planners with estimates on when to 
conduct depot level overhaul or replace ground combat equipment systems. Maintenance management 
planners refer to a technical instruction entitled "Replacement and Evacuation (R&E) Criteria; U.S. 
Manne Corps Equipment" (Tz-4710-14/1, 1988). The R&E technical instruction provides usage 
criteria that determine when an item may become due for depot level overhaul/rebuild Input fkom 
the Fleet Marine Force owning units (based on the TI4710 criteria) is the primary document that 
drives the master work schedule requirements at the depot maintenance level. Overhaul intervals for 
the R&E program criteria come tiom contractor recommendations. The differences in usell life 
estimates can be quantified for the M998 High Mobility Midtipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), 
which is the system analyzed in the case study presented in this thesis. 
The TI-4710-14 gives 90 months (7.5 years) or 20-48,000 miles (peacetime usage) as the 
criteria for nomination of a HMMWV for depot maintenance. In contrast, the Marine Corps Cost 
Factors Mand (MCO P7OOO. 14K, 1991), used by budget planners, program managers and activity 
comptrollers indicates a 48 month (4 years) "useful life" before rebuild for the HMMWV. The U.S. 
Army TACOM TWVULDP Modernization Plan estimates a fourteen year useful life for the 
HMMWV, which also is used by Marine Corps tactical wheeled vehicle Program Managers. Another 
source, the Us Mm*w Corps Concepts and Issues 1994, indicates a seventeen year HMMWV useful 
life that can be extend to 30 years through an extended service life program (ESP). Of course, 
overhaul versus buy new decisions are not made based on single estimates in such publications, but 
through detailed cost analysis. Clearly, there is a need to refine some of the numbers used in the 
assumptions for the cost models, particularly the range of usell life of our combat equipment systems. 
3 
Further the opportunity cost of performing an overhaul or replacement too early in the system life 
cycle, given that a system has considerable "useful life" remaining, may not be acceptable. This thesis 
provides an alternate approach that can complement these sources and provide additional clarifjmg 
information with which to make decisions. 
3. Pmvide Accurate Master Work & W e  l7equ1llements for POM Input 
Budgeting and scheduling overhaul requirements for the five year Program Objectives 
Memorandum (POW is a highly uncertain process. Rebuild requirements described above must be 
translated into POM data, as well as the Depot Maintenance Activity @MA) Master Work Schedule 
for production operations in the intermediate term. Accurate input data is vital to reducing variability 
in budgeting and production schedule planning. Better forecasting data can allow for Material 
Requirements Planning 0) to be done which could radically improve the quality of Depot 
Maintenance production, significantly reduce tum-around-times, and reduce inventory costs. MRP is 
not presently a part of the Depot Master Work Schedule planning process, because of difficulties in 
forecasting annual rebuild requirements. Currently, replacement part requirements are not determined 
until the equipment item arrives at the depot and is inspected. Not-in-stock requirements have to be 
requisitioned, which contributes to logistic and administrative delay time in the depot maintenance 
cycle. 
Timely forecasting for budget planning is essential to develop the Depot Master Work 
Schedule and material requirements planning. This thesis provides a method for using existing 
historical maintenance data to identi@ a usage interval when an item is actually in its deterioration 
phase. It can be projected several years in advance with relative confidence; then used for aggregate 
budget planning. Further, it can be used to aid Material Requirements Planning (MRP) in the Master 
Work Schedule. 
4. An Alternative A p a c h  lhat Incolporates Reliability Theory 
The methodology reviewed in the litemture regarding usefkl life estimates can be categorized 
into either t'pure" reliability analysis, or "pm" cost analysis. Perry (1973) combines reliability 
analysis with operational availability to determine a measure of "effectiveness" of a system. Decisions 
about system replacement can then be made on a basis of both cost and effectiveness over time. 
Perry's model assumes a constant failure distribution for mobility items. Crow (1975) argues, as does 
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most of the reliability literature (e.g. Ascher and Feingold (1984)), that complex repairable systems 
such as vehicles experience deterioration with system age, and that after a certain point they become 
too unreliable to continue in service without undergoing rebuild or replacement. The model presented 
in thls thesis seeks to incorporate reliability theory with maintenance cost analysis in order to 
determine a usage interval where a decision should be made about when to rebuild or replace a 
system Using a combination of cost effectiveness and operational availability provides an alternate 
basis for decision making. 
5. Validate Other iMDdels 
The use of reliability analysis can be used to validate conclusions draw from other sources 
that are used for major program decisions. For example, the US Manne Corps is currently involved 
with several extended service life programs for ground combat equipment systems (HQMC, 1994). 
The ESP program performance can be evaluated after a sufficient amount of time has elapsed (and 
sufficient data is collected) using the techniques addressed in this thesis. The programk projected life 
extension can be compared to the actual equipment failure patterns after rebuild, which are used to 
estimate h e  failure patterns. In other words, the technique to be presented provides a way to 
quantitatively measure the effectiveness of the ESP. Lastly, this thesis provides a way to refine the 
linear cost versus age assumption in models such as the US Army TACOMs Tactical Wheeled 
Vehicle Useful Life Determination Program The model developed here would allow TACOM to 
more accurately predict costs during the deterioration phase of equipment when failure costs are not 
linear. 
1. scope 
The scope of this thesis entails an application of reliability theory for complex repairable 
mechanical systems. Analysis of historical maintenance data on existing equipment will lead to 
expected costs associated with the "do-nothing" (minimal repairs policy) alternative for decision 
making, and is used to project future mainenance costs associated with keeping the system "as is." 
Maintenance costs associated with new programs or post-overhauhpgrades are not derived, as these 
are available through the appropriate program ofice. For the purposes of this thesis, these costs are 
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accepted as given and wed as the alternative to doing nothing. The case analysis studies the M998 
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (1 '/4 ton truck), which is an equipment item common 
to all types of Marine Corps units. The end result is to provide a means for predicting future 
maintenance costs based on an expected number of critical system failures during specified intervals. 
These failures can then be converted to costs, either in terms of replacement parts, direct-labor and 
overhead, or in terms of the downtime (operational un-availability). As such, other costs such as 
research design, test and production are considered to be sunk costs and are not included. 
2. h s ~ o m  
The underlying implication of declining DoD budgets is that the Marine Corps will most likely 
be keeping its existing equipment for longer than the programs were originally planned for. The 
periods following the Korean and Vietnamese wars saw reductions in defense spending (Schick, 1 W), 
where weapons and equipment systems remained in the defense inventory well beyond their useful 
or "book" life. Common examples are the Vietnam vintage CH-46 Medium Lift Helicopter, which 
has been in service for over 30 years, and the M151 (!A ton jeep), which was in service for over 15 
years. ?he M151's "design life" was six years (TACOM TWVULDP, 1985). 
The decision of whether to replace or overhad depends on how much useM economic life 
remains in an existing system based on the age and condition of the system, and on the cost of buying 
new. Reprmurement costs for low quantities of replacements (due to loss, accidents or combat action) 
may be extremely high for low production runs. Therefore, periodic overhaul may be the desired 
solution. 
Other technical assumptions regarding general operation of the system and mathematical 
models are discussed in the applicable sections of this thesis. In gened this thesis assumes: 
0 That the analysis of a "complex repairable mechanical system" 
The system is sufficiently complex such that no individual component or subsystem 
is the dominant cause of system failure. A Pareto analysis of part failures is used to 
Critical components are independent and serially connected, such that failure of any 
critical component causes a system operational mission failure. 
support this assumption. 
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a The reliability of the entire system is not sigmficantly improved by a mmunal repair. 
i.e., replacement of a single part (Crow. 1975). 
a That overhaulhebuild restores the stem to "same as new" or ready for issue condition 
with a reliability hct ion nearly the same as a new systemheplacement. The U.S. 
Army TACOM uses an 80% factor to estimate the effects of Overhaul. That is, 
overhaul will increase the life of an item by 80% of the ori@ economic useful life 
of an item 
a Repam are not necessarily instantaneous. but the majority of the "downtime" is due 
to administrative or logistics delay time. 
a The systems are in continual usage. Further, to predict b e  costs, annual mileage 
is simulated using the Monte Carlo techtuque, based on the distribution of available 
usage data. Since future mileages can not be known, average annual usage for like 
systems, organizations or geographical locations is used to predict future failures. 
a Mean active maintenance time and mean corrective maintenance times are constant 
for given tasks, and will generally be the same for any program alternative. 
Upgrades" are not considered in the analysis, since data is not specifically kept on 
"before" and "after" effects of overhaul for ground combat systems. 
a The effects of Product Impmvement Programs, major system modifications or "Block 
a The analyst interpreting the data results is e x p i e n d  with the MIMMS database and 
general statistical concepts. 
3. Limitations 
Conclusions drawn fiom the techniques involved in this thesis are limited to the quality of the 
field maintenance data. In this case. data fiom the Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management 
System (MIMMS) database is used for the analysis. MIMMS is subject to data inconsistencies due 
to lack of training or supervision of input clerks at the field units. Techniques are used to eliminate 
bad data and improve the codidence of the analysis. Data was also available fiom the TACOM 
Sample Data Collection (SDC) in support of the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Usefid Life Determination 
Program, but was not used for the complete analysis since failure times were not available. 
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Secondly, cafe must be taken regarding the mathematical assumptions presented in the model. 
Probabilistic modeling presented in the next chapters is based on highly simplified assumptions. "Real 
world" factors must be taken into consideration when interpreting the results of the trend data Ascher 
and Feingold (1984) present several important considerations for using reliability models. 
?he thesis is organrzed into six chapters. Chapter II introduces reliability theory and outlines 
the methodology for determining the Rate of Occurrence of Failures for a series of failure points. It 
W e r  describes the Laplace Test statistic which indicates decreasing, constant, or increasing trends 
in the time between failure data. Chapter II discusses the MIMR.rls database, and outlines the steps 
for setting up the raw data for statistical analysis. The output data can be manipulated using a 
spreadsheet package, such as Microsoft Excel on a personal computer. Chapter IV is an explanation 
of the model, using the functional form of the time variant ROCOF presented in Sadlon (1993) and 
Crow (1975). Chapter V is a case application of the model given sample data on the h4!998 
' HMMWV. Chapter VI provides conclusions and recommendations. 
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IL REXIABILITY OF REPAIRABLE SYSllQVE 
A. BACKGROUND 
This chapter outlines repairable system reliability concepts, and provides some of 1 ie 
probability models and relationships used to describe system failure processes. By projecting 
expected future system failures, cost streams associated with the failures can be computed and 
used to make decisions about maintenance policies. Mathematical derivations are not provided 
in this chapter, rather, the final resulting models or formulas to be used for the analysis are 
presented. Sources of the models are provided if M e r  clarification of the proofs or derivations 
are required. 
In reliability theory, the concept of a pwt is different ii-om that of a repairable system 
It is important to begln by distinpshing the tsvo concepts. The basic difference is that a part can 
only fail once, but a repairable system can fail many times (Ascher and Feingold, 1984). 
Therefore, the assumptions and mathematical models used to describe system failures are 
somewhat different from those used to describe failures of parts (which include non-repamble 
components and subassemblies). Although the models for system failures are more complicated 
than for part failures, the system failure process can basically be modeled according to the arrival 
pattern of the failure incidents, assuming a sufficiently complex repairable system. The failure 
pattern is generally described by the number of failures in a specified interval, and the duration 
between failures in the interval. 
The main concept used to describe the failure patterns is called the "Rate of OccUnrence 
of Failures." (ROCOF) denoted as p(t). It is a time variant rate used to describe the reliability 
phases of the system life-cycle. The ROCOF is also described as the failure intensity, f o m  of 
mortality (for non-repairable components), or peril rute (when describing repairable systems) in 
the literature. Maximum likelihood estimators, confidence bounds and hypothesis tests are 
provided which are used to estimate the ROCOF for repahable systems. Given the ROCOF, an 
expected number of failures can be forecasted for a specified future interval of time or usage. 
?his function is used to make maintenance policy decisions based on failure costs in terms of 
dollars andor readiness. Finally, the estimated parameters of the ROCOF can be used in models 
that gives the "optimal" expected usefid life, and one that yields the optimal point in a system life- 
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cycle where the tradeoff between the cost of maintenance ("rmnimal repairs") and overhaul costs 
are minimized (Barlow and Proschan 1965, and Dhillon. 1988). 
B. ~ O ~ A N D D E F J N I T I O N S  
This section defines the terminology to be used throughout this paper. Definitions and 
parameters vary throughout the literature which makes the research in some cases confusing. The 
primary sources used for the reliability parameters in this paper are dram from Ascher and 
Feingold (1984), and Sadlon (1993). Other major sources include Barlow and Proschan (1965), 
Tobias and Trindale ( 1986), Dhillon ( 1988), and Crow ( 1979, however the latter four texts use 
some different terms. definitions, and notations for parameters. For consistency, Ascher and 
Feingold's (1984) terminologies and notations are primarily used. 
1. Complex Repailable System 
A complex repairable system consists of a large number of independently acting 
components, which, after failure to perform at least one of its required functions can be restored 
to performing all of its required functions by any method, other than replacement of the entire 
system (Ascher and Feingold, 1984). This thesis also distinguishes between "critical" components 
and noncritical components in the analysis of the actual data presented in Chapter V, Failure of 
a critical component results in the system not being able to perform its combat operational mission 
(however, failure of non-critical components will contribute to total maintenance costs). Crow 
(1975) states that if the system is sufficiently complex, consisting of many components, that 
replacing a single component may not decrease the system failure probability significantly. For 
example, replacement of a starter would not alter the probability of brake failure immediately after 
the starter's replacement, Crow fkther states that the nonhomogeneous model assumes 
idealistically that the system reliability (specifically the ROCOF) does not change at all after "- r W * "  
2. O v e W  Rebuild and IRON Policies 
The Marine Corps defmes the term rebuild as: 
... that maintenance technique used to restore an item to a standard as near as 
possible to ori& or new condition in appearance, performance and life 
expectancy. This is accomplished through a maintenance technique or complete 
disassembly of the item, inspection of all parts or components, repairs or 
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replacement of worn or unserviceable elements using on@ manufacturing 
tolerances andor specifications and subsequent reassembly of the items. 
(Manne Corps Order P4790.2,1994). For the purposes of this thesis, the terms overhaul and 
rebuild are used interchangeably. Due to fiscal constraints in the past several years, depot level 
rebuild programs have not been available for most ground combat systems. Rather, a concept 
known as "Inspect and Replr Only As Necessary" @ROAN) is being employed @oak, 1988). 
'The same directive defines ROAN as: 
... that maintenance technique which determines the minimum repairs necessary 
to restore equipment, components or assemblies to prescribes maintenance 
serviceability standards by utilizing all available diagnostic equipment and test 
procedures in order to minimize disassembly and parts replacement. 
Decision makers should be aware that overhaul does not guarantee the item will have necessarily 
the same reliability as a newly manufactured item. Ascher and Feingold (1984) uses the term 
"same as new" to mean that the overhauled system's reliability does not imply the o r i d  system 
reliability. For example, a high failure intensity for a brand new system may be observed during 
bum-in or debugging. In that case, he calls the condition "bad as new." Further, Lee, Puzzuoli 
and Hoogterp (1976) use simulation to show the effects of both the degree and time of overhaul 
on U.S. Army tactical wheeled vehicles. They conclude that when a vehicle is overhauled, 
meaning components with less than 60% of their life remaining were replaced, that the item was 
returned to about 90% of its o r i d  reliability (based on reliability when the system was brand 
new), not counting the effects of bum-in. As stated in Chapter I, the Army generally uses a factor 
of SO?? of the original useful life to be the estimated life-extension after overhaulhebuild 
3. Reliability 
Blanchard (1992) defines reliability as 
... the probability that a system or product will perform in a satisfactory manner 
for a given period of time when used under specified operating conditions. 
Mathematically, reliability is expressed as the probability that an item will not fail during a 
specified interval, or 
R(t) = 1 - F(t) 
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where F(t) is the cumulative probability function providing probability that an item will faii by 
time t. Ascher and Feingold (1984) emphasize that the models for part and system reliability 
analysis are different, and that the failure processes for parts and systems cannot be interchanged. 
The basic difference is that a system can fail many times, and be restored with minimal repairs. 
while a part can only fail once. 
4. Failure and 'Failure Rate" 
A failure is an event that renders a system incapable of performing any of its functions 
is a satisfactory manner. The failure rate, normally expressed as h , is the rate at which failures 
OCCUT in a specified interval (Blanchard, 1992). The period between failure arrivals is typically 
called the "Mean Time Between Failures" (MTl3F). W F  is a suitable measure when the system 
failure intensity is constant. In this case, failures are described as independent, identically 
exponentially distributed random variables, characterized by the homogeneous Poisson process. 
However, the reliability literature (Barlow and Proschan (1963, Crow (1975), Ascher and 
Feingold (1984), Dhillon (1988) and Sadlon (1993)) shows that failure rates may decrease, remain 
COIlstant or increase with time. A more appropriate measure for system reliability is described by 
Ascher and Feingold (1984), which is a time derivative of the expected number of failures over 
an interval. They refer to the ROCOF as the probability that a failure, not necessarily the fm, 
occurs in an interval (0, t). The ROCOF is denoted as p(t). If V(t) = E[N(t + dt) - N(t)], where 
"(t)] is the number of failures occurring in (0, t), then let p(t) = dV(t)/dt. The ROCOF is 
generally recogrued as the process that describes the typical system "bathtub curve" shown in 
Figure 2.1. 
- z 
Burn-in Phase, UsefulLife , Deterioration 
Oebugging I 
intensrty) j intensity) 
' (constant failure 1 (increasing failure 
I time 
ETgure 2.1 Repaimble system BatMub Chve 
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The literature on systems reliability normally uses the Weibull probability distribution to 
characterize system failures the failure intensity during the burn-in and the deterioration phases. 
Ascher and Feingold (1984), Dhillon (1988), Tobias and Trindale (1986), and Sadlon (1993) all, 
describe the time variant ROCOF for a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) in the form: 
The NHPP is described in Section 6.b. to follow. Note the special case when p(t) is 
constant. then the parameter his the ROCOF of the homogeneous Poisson process, and the simple 
reliability function R ( r )  = e-At is used to calculate probabilities of mission success (Ascher and 
Feingold, 1984). Quation (2-2) provides the basis for the specific ROCOF function derived fiom 
the Weibull distribution which is introduced in the next section. 
5. Weibull Distibution 
Throughout the literature, the Weibull distribution is commonly used to model the 
reliability of complex repairable systems (Tobias and Tiindale. 1986; Sadlon, 1993). The Weibull 
distribution is assumed to be an appropriate model for reliability of mechanical ground combat 
systems discussed in this thesis. It can model the burn-in, useM life, and deterioration phases of 
repairable systems. The Weibull distribution is a two-parameter, more generalized form of the 
exponential distribution, which is wed in reliability models to describe the duration between 
failure events (Weibull, 1951). The Weibull distribution allows for a change of failure intensity 
over time. Depending on the shapdslope parameter (p), the Weibull distribution characterizes 
other failure distributions such as the Gamma, Raleigh, Extreme Value, or Normal distributions. 
This makes it a versatile function that can represent a family of various distributions. Table 2.1 
suIllIlliirizes special cases of the Weibull distribution for various values of the shape parameter (m. 
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Shape Pammter Value Conesponding PDF ROCOF Descriplion 
p =  1 I Exponential I1 
o < p < 1  
p=  1.5 /I 
Gamma 
Log-normal (approx) 
p = 2  
3 < p < 4  
p >  10 
Raleigh 
Normal (approx) 
Similar to Type I extreme 
value 
Exponentially decreasing from 
00 
constant 




Very rapidly increasing 
Table 2.1 Weibull bbability Disgibufion Properties 
For systems reliability modeling the two-parameter Weibull distribution is used, since it is 
reasonable to assume that the lower bound on system life is zero.* The probability density 
hct ion of the Weibull distribution is defined as: 
for t 2 0 , and f(t) = 0 elsewhere. 
?he Weibull cumulative probability distribution function is: 
F(t) = 1- e-kt' 
h e  three-parameter Weibull would include a "loczdon parameter' which is the expected minimum value of the random 
variable. In lifecycle reliability modeling, the minimum value is logically dehed as zero, i.e., the minimum life of a system 
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The probability of failure in the next instant of time, over the interval (t, t + dt) given the item 
has survived to t is called the hazard rate (for repairable systems, Ascher and Feingold call it the 
peril rate). The hazard or peril rate is expressed as: 
If f(t) is the Weibull probability density function, then equation (2-5) yields the ROCOF: 
p(t) = ILptp-1 (2-6) 
The ROCOF is used to model the failure intensity of repairable system. Equation (2-6) also 
provides the basis for predicting the expected number of failure to time t. 
6. PointP~~~essMockls 
The ability to measure and predict a system's reliability can be described by the pattem 
of failures. ?his section describes two types of point processes that can be used to model a 
systems failure prwss. The failure process, depicted in Figure 2.2, is characterized by point 
events occurring in a continuum such as operating time, or mileage in the case of vehicles 
(Won, 1993). A point process is fb-ther defined by the failure event and the observed intervals 
between successive events. 
I Q TISF, 
1 8 TISF,,..... 
I 8 TISF, 
I 8 TISF, ................................................................... 
I time+ 
I + TBFl + I  t TBF2 +I t TBF3 ... TBF,+, j +TBFn+ j 
8 TISF, ....................... 
......................................... 
I 
FTgure 2.2 Repaide System Failure pllocess 
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?he system failure events are denoted by the (S ) symbol. The total time to the i-th 
system failures (for i = 1,2,3 ... n) is denoted as TISF, , and the time between the i-th failure and 
the (i + 1)st failure is defined as TBF,. The last Occurrence of a system failure is denoted as 
TTSF,. The ?TSF,s are obtained by forming the cumulative sums of the interarrival times. In 
the case of the MIMMS database, the TTSF is simply the meter reading at failure3. 
Generally, the number of independent observations occurring within an interval are 
described by the Poisson distribution with parameter p, (denoted with subscript to distinguish it 
fiom the constant of the Weibul intensity function) while the durations between the intervals are 
described by independent exponential variables with parameter p. This notion implies that the 
average number of failures per unit time interval is p, and the mean duration between successive 
intervals is 1/p meter, Wasserman, Whitmore, 1993). Note that, as stated in the previous section, 
use of the two-parameter Weibull distribution allows for p to vary with time. Knowing the 
ITSFs, a point process can be modeled to describe the failure patterns. This thesis is concerned 
specifically with the HPP and NHPP point process models. 
a Homogeneous Poisson hcas  
The homogeneous Poisson process can be used to model a system whose failures 
are independent and identically exponentially distributed, and which show no tendency to increase 
or decrease. A mechanical system which is in its "usefid life" or "normal" phase usually show 
an HPP failure characteristic, as failures OCCUT randomly. Crow (1975) points out however, that 
many complex mechanical repairable systems, such as vehicles, tanks, or fork-lifts, generally 
experience a deterioration phase and may seldom achieve the equilibrium state of a homogeneous 
Poisson process (HPP). 
h Nohmgencous Poisson Arxless (NEE! 
The NHPP differs from the HPP in that the ROCOF (p(t)) varies with time rather 
than being constant, implying that the failure times are not necessarily identically distributed 
(Ascher and Feingold, 1984). They further show that the expected number of failures V(t) in any 
interval (t, t + dt) is given as: 
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V(t) = Em(t +dt) - N(t)] = f+'p(t)dt 
t 
(2-7) 
Substituting equation (2-6), the functional form of the time variant of the ROCOF, p(t), into 
equation (2-7), the expected number of failures during an interval can be evaluated as a definite 
integral: 
Equation (2-8) is the primary interest for developing the h e  life-cycle maintenance cost 
model used in this thesis. Equation (2-8) yields the expected number of failures in the interval 
(t, t a t )  hours (or miles) for the system This equation can be evaluated over specified intervals, 
and multiplied by expected costs associated with failures in order to derive maintenance policies. 
c TRENDANALYSIS 
There are several methods for determining whether a system shows improving, constant, 
or deteriorating trends in the time between failures. Trend analysis is useful in that it provides 
a "snapshot" of where the system is in its life-cycle, and the degree to which the peril rate of the 
system is changing. Trend analysis also provides the basis for classifjmg a data series as HPP 
or NHPP. Ascher and Feingold (1984) provides several methods for trend testing, namely: 1) 
graphical plotting techniques, 2) test statistics, and 3) the MILHDBK-189 (198 1) test. Graphical 
plotting and the Laplace trend test statistic described by Ascher and Feingold ( 1984) are used for 
this analysis. 
1. Glapllicaiplotting 
Graphical plotting is useful as a visual check of the condition of a system's failure profile. 
constructing a graphical plot of cumulative operating time against the cumulative number of 
failures illustrates the difference in deteriorating or improving trends. A plot concave down with 
respect to the origin indicates an improving system, due to increasing spacing between the system 
failure events. Conversely, a plot convex (up) with respect to the origin indicates a deteriorating 
system, The graph shown in figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between the expected number 
of cumulative failures and o p t i n g  time, for values of p = 1, > 1 and < 1. The curves illustrate 
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the three possible life-cycle phases described by the bathtub curve, and are useful when 






Figrue 2.3 Expected Number of Faillllles over Time for 
VaIioUs values of p 
2. M a c e  Test Statistic 
The primary indicator used in this thesis to determine whether a system is improvhg, in 
a steady state, or deteriorating is through the use of the LaPlace test statistic. The LaPlace test 
statistic indicates trends in the successive interarrival time data. The LaPlace test statistic for 
individual systems can be computed directly fiom existing MIMMS-AIS historical data. Further 
discussion on the actual data is presented in Chapter V. 
To calculate the test statistic 0, a system is operated until a prespecified number of 
failures have occmed, or up until a specified time. Data in the first case is calledfctim 
truncated data, the latter case is called time t m a t e d  data (Crow, 1975). The interarrival times 
(TBFJ are observed, based on the start time of the data interval. Recall that the lTSF,s are the 
observed failure times measured fiom the origin. Let TISF" denote the n-th observed failure time 
in the interval. Sadlon (1993) gives the LaPlace test statistic for a process with "n" failures as: 
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I J  = (2-9) 
The conclusions draw fiom the test are: 
0 U approximately equal to zero indicates lack of trend 
U > 0 indicates that interarrival time trends (TBFi) are decreasing, indicating 




system improvement, or reliability growth (such as debugging or "burn-in"). 
0 
M e r  system failure data have been collected and trend tests conducted, maintenance 
policies based on the condition of the equipment can be determined. For example, if the number 
of system failures is relatively constant (suggesting U z 0 and HPP failures), and that sufficient 
program dollars have been allocated for "routine" o p t i o n s  and maintenance, then the status quo 
maintenance policies are usually acceptable. However, as the number of system failures over the 
intervals increase with age, then overhaul or replacement may be considered more desirable 
alternatives. The status quo maintenance policy (performing minimal repairs each time the system 
fails) will generally have linear cumulative annd  costs during the wefuZ Z$e of the system. 
However, as the system begins to deteriorate, the costs can increase linearly or exponentially with 
time depending on the failure intensity, or ROCOF. The value of the LaPlace test statistic can 
be used to interpret how rapidly the system is deteriorating. As the value of U increases, the slope 
of the ROCOF increases, indicating that the system is deteriorating rapidly. 
The next section describes the hkximum Likelihood Estimators (MLEs) used to 
determine the shape or slope parameter P, and the scale or characteristic life parameter h for the 
failure process model described in equation (2-6). Before the estimate V(t) can be applied to 
policy decisions, the values for the parameters h and p must be estimated. 
?he LaPlace trend test statistic indicates the trend in the times between failures for a 
system If the results of the test conclude that a system is deteriorating (v > 0), then the NHPP 
failure process is assumed. Assuming an NHPP, and the Weibull failure intensity described by 
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equation (2-6), then by observing the failure events of a system, Crow (1975), and Bain (1978) 
derive MLEs for h and p. These MLEs can be estimated &om data existing in the MIMMS-AIS 
database which contains the maintenance history data on Marine Corps ground combat equipment. 
The times to system failures or, the meter readings at each i-th failure are used to calculate the 
MLEs. Assuming that the failure observations starting &om system time zero, the maximum 
likelihood estimates for K=l system are (Sadlon, 1993): 
and 
n 2 =- me 
where, m F n  = Total time to last observed system failure 
m F i  = Total times to i-th system failures (see figure 2.2) 
n = Total number of system failure observations 







m F "  = Total Time to n-th System Failure of the q-th system 
'ITSF, = Total Time to i-th System Failure of the q-th system v 
Nq = Number of failure observations for the q-th system 
NP1 for failure truncated data 
Nq for time truncated data 
Ms = (  
also. 
(2- 13) 
Maintenance or failure data is most likely not available on most Marine Corps systems 
dating back to their fielding date, i.e., when the system was brand-new (To = 0), therefore, the 
MLES for p and h must be computed by rescaling the TIISFis. 'Ihe timeline below illustrates the 
situation where only a portion of the system's history data is available: 
Observed failure events 
For example, suppose failure data is available for the period 22,000 miles to 60,000 miles 
for a vehicle. Equations (2-10) through (2-13) assume that the TISFis are observed since To= 0. 
Therefore, the known data must be rescaled to reflect the fm observed failure as time zero. The 
implication is that the first failure observation in the data set will become zero, and the 
subsequent failure times reflect the differences between the next failure arrival times. To 
illustrate, consider the data below 
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The actual MIMMS-AIS TTSF, data used for the case analysis of the HMMWV sample 
population required rescaling. Rescaling the 'ITSF, data is only necessary when failure data for 
the entire life history is unavailable. Note that the resulting parameters p and and the LaPlace 
statistic describe the ROCOF for the actual data interval, i.e., for the interval 22136 to 33489 
miles in the example above. Due to the cost and lack of need for maintaining archive 
maintenance data, MIMR/Ls-AIS history data only contains the past 36-54 months of a system's 
maintenance history. Since the objective of this analysis is to estimate the present failure intensity 
in order to forecast the remaining life of the system, the past 36-54 months of historical data is 
most likely acceptable, given that there are enough data points to arrive at a confident conclusion. 
1. Confidence Intewak for p and 3t 
Decision makers using the model presented in this thesis should be aware of the 
confidence interval associated with the point estimators described in the preceding section. As 
Chapter will show, considerable historical data exists for rViarine Corps principal end items 
through the MIMpI/Is-AIS database. Generally, given more observations, and longer total observed 
times for the samples, better conclusions can be dram about the overall status of the equipment. 
The purpose of this section is to provide the confidence intervals discussed by Crow (1975) which 
are used to evaluate the confidence intervals around the point estimators. 
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The chi-squared statistic is used to test hypothesis about the true value of p using the fact 
that 2Mp/f3 is distributed as a chi-square random variable with 2M degrees of freedom Thus, 
the lOo(1- a)% lower and upper confidence limits (La, UCL respectively) for p using the x2 
statistic are: 
and 
where f(q 2h4) is a chi-squared statistic with (1-a) quantile and 2M degrees of fieedom 
After an estimator for P has been calculated, Crow uses the result together with the failure 
arrival times to estimate confidence intervals for h Under time truncated testing on K systems, 
the lower and upper confidence bounds respectively, for h are: 
~’(1- 4 ,  2N+2) 
A*@) = K 
These equations are provided as reference for the case analysis of the Marine Corps data 
presented in Chapter V. 
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Barlow and Proschan (1965) discuss a model to find an optimal interval for system 
replacement or overhaul that minimizes the expected costs of performing minimal repairs. For a 
deteriorating complex system they assume that minimal repairs (such as replacing a glow plug) 
do not disturb the system's ROCOF. 'Therefore, at some pint, reliability and operational 
availability become unacceptable due to decreasing times between failures. This is consistent with 
the assumptions made in Chapter I. Here, it is assumed that overhaul or replacement renews the 
system to an k m e  as new" level of reliability, to the extent that operational availability meets 
expected mission standards. They refer to work by Barlow and Hunter (1960) to calculate the 
optlmal period between overhaul or replacements for systems over an infinite time span. Barlow 
and Proschan (1965) show that when a system has a Weibull intensity function, with p > 1 
(system is deteriorating), that the time which minimizes the expected maintenance cost is given 
as: 
(2- 18) 
where, c, = expected cost of minimal repairs 
c, = cost of system replacement or overhaul 
MDre discussion of equation (2-18) is presented in Chapter N as well as cash flow analysis of 
maintenance policy and overhaul alternatives. 
Dhillon (1988) offers a simple model to estimate the economic useful life L, of a 
repairable system expressed as: 
2(K- S) I 
Le' [Tf (2- 19) 
where C is the annual i n c m e  in maintenance costs, K is the acquisition cost of the system, and 
S is the salvage value. 
Both equations (2-18) and (2-19) can be used as rough estimates to the numbers derived 
through the program managers, but should not be used exclusively for the ultimate decision. They 
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can be helpful for determining how close some of the useful life estimates and overhaul intervals 
are based on known costs. 
F. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the basic reliability theory and models 
associated with complex repairable systems. The goal is to determine the projected ROCOF for 
a system based on historical data. System reliability is essentially an analysis of the arrival 
patterns of system failures. Knowing the failure arrival patterns, the data can be fit to a likely 
distribution to forecast future system failures. The hazard, or peril rate under the Weibull 
distribution can be used to represent the system ROCOF for each stage of its life-cycle. The 
Laplace test statistic shows whether system failure trends are improving (bum-in), constant 
(normal life), or deteriorating. When the Laplace statistic indicates that the system is 
deteriorating, the NHPP assumption is used to model the failure process. Maximum likelihod 
estimators for the ROCOF parameters are derived fiom the system data, and confidence intervals 
can be constructed around those estimators. Knowing the parameters of the ROCOF, cost- 
minimizing equations can be used to determine an optimal interval for system overhad or 
replacement. The next chapter describes the Marine Corps maintenance database that is used for 
the case analysis. 
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IIL iUIMMS-AIS DATABASE ANALYSIS 
k BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data available for use with the formulas 
discussed in Chapter II. The Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System- 
Automated Information System Field Mamtenance Subsystem (MIMMS-AIS FMSS) is supported 
by a centralized database which contains historical maintenance dormation on Marine Corps 
ground equipment. MIMMS-AIS is used to record, process, store, and produce required 
maintenance management data for use at all levels of command in the Marine Corps. Daily shop 
actions and equipment job stam are manually entered into the FMSS by Fleet Marine Force 
organizational and intermediate level maintenance shops. Daily, weekly, monthly or as-required 
output reports are generated by the FMSS for use at all management levels. A key feature is the 
ability to provide information required to support maintenance engineering, resource management, 
and maintenance production. MIMMS-AIS interfaces with the Marine Corps supply system 
(SASSY) which provides for all data pertinent to requisitioning, status, issue, and cancellation of 
repair parts (UM 4790-5, 1987). 
Another data source for equipment common to the USMC and U.S. Army, (such as 
tactical wheeled vehicles) is through TACOM TACOM tracks specific principal end items 
throughout their life-cycle, and monitors the repair shops where the items are maintained, which 
gives it a level of control over the quality of the data in the sample data collection (SDC). Marine 
Corps decision makers should consider any operational usage differences between Marine Corps 
and Army systems when using TACOMs SDC. In most cases, it can be assumed that usage of 
common principal end-items for both services are the same. 
Althoughthis chapter describes procedures to analyze the MIMMS-AIS data, it is intended 
to apply also to the next generation maintenance management system, the Asset Tracking Logistics 
and Supply System I (ATLASS rr). The general concepts and approach discussed here are 
assumed to be valid for both systems. 
This section briefly describes the procedures used at the maintenance shop level, including 
the flow of transactions, in order to understand how to intexpret the data and idmm 
inconsistencies. The Equipment Repair Order (ERO) is an administrative form (NAVMC 10245), 
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identified by a unique number, used to track the maintenance progress of a single end-item 
(repairable system) in the maintenance cycle (TM 4700- lY1. 1994). It is the sowce document 
for all maintenance related activities, including calibration, modification, and scheduled 
maintenance. EROs are initiated for any corrective or scheduled preventative maintenance 
performed at second echelon or higher repair levels (MCO P4790.2. 1994). Data input fields on 
the ERO and subsequent status changes are used to generate the various maintenance management 
automated reports. In the "real world," the reliability of the input data is subject to the level of 
training and supervision of the input clerks; therefore, an understanding of where the data comes 
fiom is necessary. 
The ERO includes data such as the date received in shop, serial number, item 
nomenclature, defect@), maintenance category and other descriptive maintenance data. Inpa 
codes for each ERO field are provided in UM 4790-5. Daily, all new EROs and status changes 
to existing EROs are keypunched by data clerks into MIMMS-AIS, and transmitted to the 
Regional Automated Services Center (RASC) mainfbme via local area network or other medium. 
ERO change transactions are submitted whenever the mainterice categoryy defect description, repair 
status, receipt of parts, or other stam changes occur. Repair parts, components, and secondary 
repairables can be requisitioned through MIMMS-AIS since it interfaces with the supply system 
during the daily update cycles. Replacement parts are requisitioned for the ERO using an "ERO 
Shopping List" (EROSL, NAVMC 10925). When all parts have been received and applied to the 
system, repairs are completed and quality control checks are done. If no further maintenance 
actions or repairs are required, the ERO is then closed The f d  maintenance data pertaining to 
the ERO to include all received parts, the primary meter reading (mileage, hours, etc.), and direct- 
labor hours then become part of the ERO history for that item These items are stored as database 
elements for each ERO record. In bcel ,  they are the c o l m  headings for the file, and each 
separate ERO is a row, or database record 
A flow diagram of general shop maintenance procedures is found in Appendix F of the 
MIMMS Field procedures Manual (MCO P4790.2Cy 1994). 
1. I&ntification of Faillnes 
System failures are idenWied one of two ways; either by the equipment operator during 
usage, or by the organizational maintenace shop during the performance of Scheduled preventative 
maintenance (SPM). Detailed inspections of components and subassemblies are performed chning 
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SPMs. and "worn out" or unserviceable components are identified. Normally, the equipment 
techcal manual (TM) will speci@ serviceability standards for components. Although a part has 
not necessarily failed, if its condition is worse than the standards. it is replaced. For our purposes, 
this condition is defined as a part failure. If (unscheduled) corrective maintenance (CM) is 
identified during the conduct of a scheduled preventative maintenance ERO, then normally a 
separate CM ERO is initiated (TM 4700-15, 1994). The other method of failure identification is 
when the equipment operator identifies a system failure during system prechecks or operation. 
In that case, the defect is identified to the supporting maintenance shop and an EX0 is initiated. 
2. ~ A I s H i s t O I y ~ l e s  
The MIMMS-AIS Master ERO File contains approximately 36 past months worth of ERO 
history for all systems which had maintenance performed, recorded and input by unit maintenance 
shops. The data of interest for this analysis includes the timdmileage between EROs, the active 
maintenance time interval (time between the open and close dates of the ERO), labor hours, and 
parts applied under each ERO. 
Historical maintenance data is captured on a quarterly basis by each of the RASCs and 
is transmitted to a central database at the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia The 
historical MIMMS-AIS data serves as the basis for determining parts usage and costs, labor hours, 
repair category and status, maintenance engineering, modification control, and other descriptive 
repair data. This data can also be converted into the chronological time-between-failure statistics 
discussed in Chapter II for analysis. Detailed discussion on the MIh4MS-AIS FMSS can be found 
h MIMMS-AIS Users Manual (UM 4790-5, 1987). 
C "REAL WXLD" DATA -ATlONS 
1. MlMNBAISPtimaryMeterReachngs 
In the current system, the meter reading (mileage) is recorded when the ERO is closed 
not when the system is inducted into the shop for maintenance. The implication is that the system 
can, and normally is, o p t e d  during the period while the ERO is open. This means that the 
meter reading is not the Time-At-Failure but rather the Time-At-Restomdion. Under ideal 
circumstanCes, (i.e., instantanmus repair) these would be equal, but in the "real world," they are 
not. For the model presented in this thesis, the assumption is that the relative difference between 
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. .. 
the meter reading at failure (when the ERO is initiated) and when it is closed is not significant, 
in terms of the total life usage. That is, if the TTSF" is large relative to the intervals around the 
l[TsFis, then we should not be concerned between the differences in meter readings4. 
&ample: Suppose an M998 HMMWV had its i-th mission operational failure on January 
1st with a mileage ('ITSF,) of 16,000 miles. It is inducted into the maintenance shop that day and 
an ERO is opened on the item During the diagnostic inspection., several parts are identifred as 
needing replacement; an alternator to restore the HMWWV to operational status, and several non- 
critical components. The same day, the alternator is exchanged for a rebuilt one at the 
Maintenance Float activie, and the vehicle is restored to a combat operational status. However, 
the noncritical parts are back-ordered in the supply system. and the ERO remains administratively 
open in a short-parts staim. In the meanwhile, the HMMWV is used for a field training exercise 
and accrues mileage. The non-critical parts arrive on March loth, and the HMMWV is recalled 
into the shop for the parts to be applied. The mileage of the vehicle when the ERO is closed is 
16,875. The only meter reading that is visible in the MIMMS-AIS history associated with this 
parhcular ERO is 16,875. 
Ihe example above is not unlike what actually occurs in most Fleet Marine Force ~ t s .  
MIMMS-AIS currently does not capture the mileage at failure, so the 'ITSF data available for the 
analysis is based on the assumption that the difference between mileage at failure and mileage at 
restoration is small relative to the total system mileage. Recommended solutions to this problem 
are offered in the Conclusion chapter of this thesis. 
Another sigrufcant problem with meter readings in FMF maintenance shops is inaccurate 
data input. For reasons due to lax shop management procedures or difficulties in getting the 
M S  to "close" the EROs, often times the actual equipment meter readings are intentionally not 
correctly entered. The most common "shortcut" is to enter "999999" in the meter-reading field 
of the ERO to force the system to accept the EROclose transaction. Other common meter 
4the "true" TTsFi would be the mileage at restoration (ERO close) minus the mileage at the i-th failure. We assume for this 
thesis that the difference is insignificant compared to the total mileage at the most recent failure, ?TsF,. 
"he Maintenance Float Activity Groups provide 2 pool of ready-for-issue secondary repairables (SDRS), either new or 5 
rebuilt, in exchange for unseniceable SDRs f k m  customer units. 
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readings include low whole numkrs such as 1, 10 or 100. A second observation is that 
sometimes the julian date of the close transaction is inadvertently entered in the meter-reading 
field. This situation is usually obvious when reviewing the data. For example, a mileage of 
"94032" miles entered on February lst, 1994 (94032 julian date) is easy to spot. ?he third 
common problem is that some of the meter readings were entered with the tenths digit included, 
when MIMMS-AIS does not allow for tenths. In this situation, the meter-reading in the data 
should be screened for the following pattern: 
Meter Miles Between 
m m - Failures (computed field) 
PK345 3/15/93 16,23 5 
PK124 5/04/93 17,044 809 actual 
PJ874 9/18/93 177,355' 160,311 (691 actual) 
PM22 1 10/21/93 17,856 -159,499 (121 actual) 
* In this example, it is obvious that the mechanic included the tenths reading fiom the 
odometer, when 17,735 miles should have been entered. A logic flag can be used to identlfy this 
condition, and the data can be manually adjusted if the mistake is obvious enough. 
The last condition that creates "suspect" meter-reading data is when the physical meter 
itself is replaced. In this case, the logic flag might highlight a low mileage reading following a 
high mileage reading. This situation could also explain when the meter reading is a low number 
such as "1" or "10." In that case, a defect code would appear in the ERO history reflecting 
"METER-RPLC" in MIMMS-AIS, or code 334." If the "X34" code does not appear in the 
defmt-code field of the ERO history, then the analyst should assume that the meter reading is 
suspect input. For the data on the € M W " s  used in the case analysis, approximately twenty 
percent of the meter readings were 'tsuspect" for reasons cited above, and were scrubbed prior to 
analysis. 
2. Multiple ER@ Q e n  Simultaneously on the Same System 
Multiple corrective maintenance EROs are allowed to be opened on an equipment system 
at one time, which sometimes creates a problem with ordering the MIMMS-AIS failure data. For 
example, an unscheduled CMERO may be open in a pending status on an item that is later used 
in support of a separately h d e d  exercise. Repaus incurred during the exercise have to be 
recorded under a separate CM ERO to reflect the different accounting data. At one time, two 
EROs can be open at the same time on the same item. There is no problem in the analysis ifthe 
first ERO is closed before the second However, if the repairs for the second ERO are done 
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quickly (i.e., the parts were immediately available), the second ERO might be closed out before 
the first. Since the Master ERO History files are sorted by the date EROs are opened the mileage 
Will appear to have decreared for the second ERO, and would reflect a negative time-between- 
failures. For this reason. the raw MIMR/Ls-AIS data should be either be resorted by the ERO close 
htes, or manually adjusted in order to have the mileage reflect sequential failures. The use of 
a logic flag, such as "IF w l e s  Between Failures < 01" will identie these situations. 
Approximately ten percent of the data used in the case analysis fell into this category. Appendix 
A provides the logic flags used to screen the Excel data. 
3. 
A final issue to be considered when analyzing the raw MIMMS data is the fact that most 
EROs remain open for a considerable length of time, which means that the EROs can cover 
multiple separate failures with only one (final) meter reading recorded. The effects of ERG 
staying open for so long is that any meter readings for subsequent failures other than defect that 
warranted the ERO in the first place are not recorded. Unit level maintenance on organic 
equipment is often recorded on "perpetual EROs" for administrative convenience. The MIMMS- 
AIS data for the case analysis had a mean ERO time (the difference between the close and open 
dates) of 120 days. ?he mean lag time between when parts were ordered and when they were 
received was approximately 20 days. The long ERO times impacts the Total Time to System 
Failure ( n S F )  data, in that much of it is not recorded in the system Despite these problems, 
the instananeous repair assumption still applies in this thesis. It is assumed that critical repairs 
are completed the same day that parts are received, which is normally true for most Marine Corps 
maintenance shops. 
h n g  Maintenance Qcle Times for ERG 
Ehmple: Suppose an M998 HMMWV is inducted to the shop on March 1st due to a bad 
starter. Mer inspection and acceptance, the starter is exchanged at the hhintenance Float 
Activity, but seved other noncritical parts are backordered. Tzhe vehicle is restored to 
operational status the next day, while the EX0 remains open pending receipt of the other parts. 
A few weeks and several hundred miles later, the HMWWV has another system failure due to a 
wheel seal. It comes into the shop again, and the wheel seal and several other parts are 
requisitioned under the existing ERO. The existing ERO is used for convenience since it is 
already open for that system's serial number. ?he cycle continues until all of the requisitioned 
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parts have been received and applied. It is not unusual for some EROS to remain open on 
individual equipment systems for over six months. 
Unfortunately, MTMMS-AIS currently does not reflect mileages at subsequent failures 
under the same ERO. This concept may account for a portion of the variance which widens the 
confidence intervals in the data. Program managers, and other decision makers at the ILSD 
should keep in mind the factors that limit the data. In most cases it can be assumed that the parts 
are applied on the same day that they are received, so that the instantaneous repair assumption is 
valid, but it does not count down-time due to administrative or logistics delays. 
One possible way to address this would be to measure the time between when "batches" 
of parts are received and when the next "batch" of parts are ordered for a system under the same 
ERO. Here, we define a the failure point as the date on which parts were requisitioned, assuming 
parts are requisitioned on the same day that the system failed. We huther assume that critical 
parts are applied to the vehicle the same day they are received. The interval between when a 
batch of parts were received (and the system restored) and when the next batch was subsequently 
ordered (due to the next failure) would be the TBF,. To convert to miles, multiply the interval 
in dayslyears by average daily/annd mileage. Unfortunately, the real world data has far too 
much variance in equipment usage to draw any meaningfd conclusions. Using an indirect means 
to compute failure intervals is not desirable. Nevertheless, this alternative would be a better way 
to define the interarrival of failure times, given a system design change that incorporates miles 
at failures in the MIMMS-AIS system. 
The sample data collection (SDC) used by TACOM does attempt to record the mileage 
at each maintenance incident. Further, cumulative miles are accounted for when meters are 
replaced. However, the TACOM data that was provided for this analysis only contained 
equipment mileages at the beginning and ending of the quarterly sample periods. The actual meter 
readings at the i-th failures were not available, therefore trend patterns in the system failure data 
was not visible, and therefore not conducive to this analysis. 
D. PREpARAnoN OF THE RAW MIMIW3-AI.S DATA FOR USE WJ3X-I 
MImo6oFrExm(spREADsHEET) 
Analysis of the MIMMS-AIS data utilized Microsofl Excel, a Windows-based spreadsheet 
for personal computers. The data is collected through standard p r d u r e s  odined in the 
MMMS Field P r d m s  Manual (MCO P4790.2C, 1994), and the Users Mand (UM 4790-5, 
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1988) and downloaded via mainhme computer into database files. Sample sizes should be 
determined by standard statistical methods, however analysis of the raw data is limited to the 
memory capacity of the PC being used. System memory should be considered in addition to 
required sample sizes when using the methods presented in this thesis. After the data is obtaind 
it must be converted into a form that can be used for the analysis. 
Appendix A contains a description of the database fields, formulas and logic flags used 
for the model. In general, each row of the MIMMS-AIS database constitutes a maintenance 
record, such as an ERO and associated parts requisitioned. Additional documentation can be 
obtained &om the author. 
1. MajorDataCategones 
The first step in the data preparation is to specify to the data source the sample size and 
the repamble system to be analyzed. MIMpI/Is-AIS contains approximately the past thrrty-six 
months of historical data on all repairable systems in the Marine Corps inventory. Equipment is 
designated by its model nomenclature, but more specifically by other descriptive codes or numbers 
such as the National-Stock-Number (NSN) or its Table of Authorized Material Control Number 
(TAMCN). The data query was based on a single TAMCN. Secondly, the ERO History file can 
be segregated by Regional Area Codes (RAG), such as U.S. East coast, US. West Coast, and 
the Western Pacific region (Okinaw). Usage and failure patterns may be different for each of 
these populations, so the data was broken down by separate RAC for the analysis. Lastly, the 
year of manufacture, or other data such as lot number may contribute variation in the population's 
failure pattm. The TACOM SDC database includes the equipment manuf'acture year directly 
in the data. MIMMS-AIS however, does not contain the year of manuf'acture in the database. 
That data is available through the respective inventory managers at MCLB, Albany, and has to 
be merged separately with the MIMMS-AIS data. 
'The next step is to sort the data and purge database entries that show inconsistencies or 
are "suspecf'l as described earilier in Section C. 
2. soItirlgandpuogingtheData 
'Ihe data requested should be sorted by serial number, and then by the "date recieved in 
shop," which is assumed to be very close to the date of system failure. In certain cases it may 
be advantageous to sort by the ERO close date instead of the open date, due to the multiple ERO 
problem described earlier. To properly use the non-homogeneous Poisson process ("P) 
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assumption described in Chapter II, recall that the data must be chronologically ordered according 
to the sequence of i-th failures. It is assumed that regardless of whether the data is sorted by the 
open or close dates of the EROs, that the meter-readings at failure (restoration) are in the proper 
sequence. 
Logic flags are used to highlight "suspect" or inconsistent data, such as the bad meter 
readings described in Section C. Logic flags are also used to identi@ the next ERO recorded on 
the same serial number, or to differentiate between different serial numbers. Use of numeric logic 
flags can be used to count the number of records that meet a specified criteria. These logic flags 
and counters are summanzed * in Appendix A. Suspect data such as the meter readings described 
earlier should be eliminated. 
Noncritical parts ordered should not be counted as system operational mission failures. 
Critical components that do cause mission operational failure are identified in MIMMS-AIS by 
a "Combat Essentiality Code" (CEC) equal to 0, 1,5, or 6. EROs not meeting this criteria should 
not be considered as mission operational failures. These are used as query criteria for the data 
extract. 
A caution: MIMMS-AIS uses a field called a kategory code" which defines whether an 
ERO is open for a mission operational failure or noncritical maintenance. All category codes 
must be requested in the query, since an ERO designated with a mission critical category code 
may be downgraded to non-critical repairs (Category code "X' or 'W) prior to closing the ERO. 
Therefore, to quay the system only for Category code W' (system failure) EROs would cause 
missing data. It is better to define mission operational failure, (critical maintenance EROs) by the 
CEC codes of the parts requisitioned to restore the item 
3. T i  Tnmcated and Failme Tnmcated Data 
Chapter II provided two sets of maximum likelihood estimators presented by Crow (1975) 
for detexmining the ROCOF fimction for a system. The time truncated data holds the ending time 
for the observations constant and number of failures as variable. The failure truncated data 
observes systems to a specified number of failures, where the end time of the observations is 
variable. The MIMMS-AIS data readily lends itself to time truncation data. For example, a 
database criteria can be specified to p v i d e  all m r d s  for vehicles with less than or equal to 
50,000 miles. Then, we simply count the number of failures and measure the intervals between 
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failures. Hence. for the case analysis presented in Chapter V, the data is time truncated and the 
appropriate formulas from Crow (1975) are used. 
4. Mian Dates iniMIMiW-AIS 
MIMMS-AIS uses Julian dates to record maintenance actions. That is, Januar_v lst, 1994 
is 94005, and December 15th is 94349. In order to perform computations With these dates, they 
need to be converted to year and date values in Excel, and then combined with logic statements 
to correctly perform subtractions. For example, if we want to compare the difference in dates 
between when an ERO is opened and when it is closed, we cannot always pedorm the subtraction 
directly. Suppose an ERO was opened on December 15% and closed on January 5tk The 
calendar difference is 21 days, however the difference between Julian numbers is 656. An 
algorithm for computing these differences is provided in Appendix A. 
5. Pareto Analysis 
In order to show that a repairable system is sufficiently complex enough to use the model 
presented in this thesis, it is usefid to conduct a Pareto analysis of the system failure causes. 
Since the data identifies replacement components that presumably caused the system failures, the 
MIMMS-AIS data can be transformed into a Pareto ranking to draw conclusions about the primary 
contributors to system failure. 'The 80/20 rule might be used to validate the "sufficiently complex 
system" assumption. If less than 20% of the components cause 80% or more of the system 
failures, then either poor quality components or improper equipment operation might be the causes 
of the system failures, and M e r  investigation would be needed prior to making an overhaul 
decision. Conversely, if greater than 20% of the components cause 80% of the system failures, 
then the system is assumed to be sufficiently Complex to use the assumptions. Reasonable 
judgement should be used when components are used to defrne system failures; for example, tires, 
brake shoes, and batteries for vehicles are replaced on a regular basis due to normal wearout, and 
may not need to be considered when evaluating the system failure complexity. 
Microsofi Excel makes the Pareto analysis relatively easy. The repair part data can be 
sorted by stock-number and counted Apivot table was generated which provides usage subtotals 
for each separate component. The relative fkquency of each part is the subtotal divided by the 
total number of parts in the sample. The relative fkquencies can then be classified by cumulative 
proportion of the total sample, into classes such as A, B and C parts. 
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Table 3.1 provides summary Pareto data of critical repair parts replaced on a sample of 
n = 276 systems over a 54 month period. The table shows that five of the parts out of 142 types 
in the sample caused 2734 of the system failures. or 38% of the total failures. 
Number of Types in Class 
Total tyDes of parts replaced: 142 
Total wage of parts replaced: 7,281 
Number of Failures Contribution to 
in Class Total Failures 
B 
C 
10 1577 22% 
127 2970 40% 
Table 3.1 Pareto Analysis of Failure (3-~1~ed By Parts 
It should be noted that one part had the highest individual contribution to system failure 
(16%), but this may have been due to special circumstances, explained in A p n d k  C. The 
remaining A parts were between 3-7% (each) of the total failures; the B parts ranged from 1.6 to 
2.8% of the total failures. Nine of the C parts contributed between I-2% of the total system 
failures, and the remainder of the parts each contributed to less than 1% of the system failures. 
Further reliability analysis and product improvement may be warranted on the one part that 
contributed to 16% of the system failures. Based on these results, it is safe to conclude that the 
system is sufficiently complex enough to assume independent failure causes. We can therefore 
classify this system as a "complex repairable system" (Crow, 1975). The detailed data is 
presented in Appendix C. 
E SUMMARY 
Considerable data is available from both the Marine Corps and the U.S. Army available 
for use with reliability engineering theoy. Interarrival times for system failures can be derived 
fhm either the MIMMS-AIS database, or the Army TACOM Sample Data Collection. These two 
databases do not have the same structure, therefore the assumptions and procedures for screening 
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the data for each are not interchangeable. The main purpose of this chapter is to identify 
interpretations of the MIMMS-AIS data Similar data is available from the U.S. Army. 
Knowing the interarrival patterns of the system failures. the reliability concepts discussed 
in Chapter II are applied to the data to determine the condition of the equipment, and make 
projections about the m e .  Forecasted failures are then used for decision making between 
alternative replacement, overhaul or minimal r e p  policies, or to evaluate the effectiveness of 
extended service life programs. 
When using idealistic models, it is critical to consider the assumptions and the source of 
the data. Knowing how the data is generated helps to identi@ causes of variability, and helps 
eliminate "suspect" data prior to drawing conclusions. It is important to be able to recognize the 
"garbage in - garbage out" situation, caued by erroneous input or missing data This chapter 
provids examples of some of the common causes of inconsistencies in MIMMS-AIS data Large 
databases can be screened for such inconsistencies by using logic flags and indicators designed 
to highlight such situations. Proper use of the statistics described in Chapter 11 depends on correct 
ordering, sample sizes, and truncation of the data, as well as the knowing assumptions and 
limitations of the models. MIMPVIS-AIS provides the historical data on Marine Corps unique 
equipment for reliability analysis. 
The next chapter presents a cost-based model that may be used to project the costs of 
expected failures over fbture intervals. 
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IV. DESCRIPTION OF 'IHE MODEL 
A. INIRODUCIION 
This chapter outlines a model developed for this thesis which combines system reliability 
with the cost of failures that are used when evaluating alternative "do-nothing" or overhaul 
decisions. The system "cost of failure" used here is defined as the direct costs associated with 
restoring the system to operational status. For simplicity, each Equipment Repair Order (ERO) 
reflects a single system failure, such that the cost of replacement parts plus the cost of direct labor 
are taken to be the failure costs for a repair of a single system The model presented in this 
chapter uses historical maintenance data on a system using the time to failure data, in order to 
obtain rnaximw likelihood estimates of the parameters of the ROCOF, p(t), presented in Chapter 
II. The "do-nothing" alternative means that the system is restored by MLnimal repairs each time 
it fails. As the system begins to fail more frequently due to deterioration, the cost of owning that 
system may increase at an increasing rate. At some point, it is more economical to overhaul or 
replace the system ?his chapter outlines the steps used to analyze a "do-nothing" versus overhaul 
decision about a Marine Corps system based on MIMMS-AIS data. ?he next chapter presents a 
case study of the M998 HMMWV using the model described in this chapter. 
Since no HMMWVs have been overhauled, no data exists on the reliability of the system 
after overhaul. Lee, Fuzzuoli and Hoogterp (1975) have developed a simulation program which 
can be used to analyze the effects of overhaul on military vehicles for various overhaul intervals 
and percentage of components replaced Their conclusions show that under most conditions, a 
system is restored to about 90% of its origmal, or as new reliability after overhaul. The US Army 
Tank-Automotive command assumes that overhaul extends the system life to roughly 80% of its 
economic useM life before overhaul. After overhaul, the system failure rate increases with age 
at roughly the same rate as it did prior to overhaul. 
This analysis can be described in two parts; first, analysis of the system reliability which 
involves estimation of the ROCOF, and second, the cost estimate of the do-nothing alternative. 
'Ihe MIMMS data provides for computing both the reliability and costs for the analysis on the 
existing system. ?he cost estimates for the overhaul or rebuy alternatives are beyond to scope of 
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this thesis; therefore, cost assumptions regarding overhaul and rebuy alternatives is based on the 
appropriate Program Manager's estimates. 
1. Estimation of the Rate of Occunence of F a i l m  
The objective is to estimate the system rate of Occurrence of failures (ROCOF) given by 
p(t) as described in Chapter II. in order to obtain a quantitative measure of where the system is 
in its life-cycle. i.e., in its "usefui life" or deterioration phase. The integral of the ROCOF, given 
by quation (2-8) provides an estimate of the expected number of failures. V(t), within a defined 
interval (Ascher and Feingold (1984), Sadlon (1993), Barlow and Proschan (1965)). Expected 
costs of those failures can be multiplied by the number of failures in the intervals to determine 
total costs. The steps involved in the ROCOF model are: 
Step 1. Obtain the Total Time to System Failure (TISF') data on the system. Ifdata is 
available starting from time zero, then equations (2-10) through (2-13) can be used to 
obtain the MLES for p and h . If data is only available for a limited history, then the 
'ITSF, are rescaled with the "first" failure in the observed interval taken to be time = 0 
for computational purposes. 'The resulting MLES will actually describe the failure 
intensity for the interval in which the 'ITSF data was taken. 
Step 2. Investigate for major contributing causes of repeated system failures. The 
purpose is to prevent making an overhaul/replace decision based on the contribution of 
a single component or small group of components which are causing most of the system 
failures. A Pareto analysis is used in this thesis to establish whether the system is 
sufficiently complex enough to verify whether a small group of parts dominate the total 
system failure causes or not. Other techniques such as fault tree analysis, failure mode 
effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), or a review of Quality Deficiency Reports (SF- 
368) may provide more detailed analysis of contributing failure causes. 
Step 3. Perform trend analysis, using either the Laplace trend test, the MlL-HDBK-189 
test or graphical plotting to determine whether the system failure rate shows constant or 
deteriorating trends. 
Step 4. If the failure rate shows a constant trend, continue to use current ( lhm)  O&M 
cost projections when evaluating decision alternatives. A constant failure rate would 
assume the HPP failure model, therefore linear cost assumptions would be appropriate. 
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Step 5. If the failure rate shows an increasing trend. estimate the ROCOF by calculating 
the MLEs for p and h presented in Chapter II. The next section presents a spreadsheet 
model which computes individual system MLES as well as pooled MLEs for the sample. 
Costs will increase as a function of the expected number of failures in time t (Note: 
Depending on the value of P, i.e., when p z 1, the V(t) may appear to be nearly linear, 
in which case it may be simpler to use a linear cost approximation. Whether to use the 
linear assumption or not would be based on the fit of a linear trendline to the ROCOF, 
and the resulting coefficient of determination). 
Step 6. Forecast the expected number of failures for hture periods as a basis for 
comparison to the overhauvreplace decisions. Bain (1978) provides further dormation 
on prediction intervals. 
The steps listed above can be summarized by the flowchart shown in Figure 4.1. It 
depicts the steps to decide whether to use the HPP or NHPP assumptions: 








using current cost =pi- assumptions 
projections 
FEW 4.1 System Faillue Rate Analysis 
2. Cost Analysis 
?he underlying assumption in the cost analysis is that the number and fEequency oi 
fdures increase as mechanical systems age, and therefore the cumulative costs associated with 
the failures do also. For this analysis, only the variable costs of parts and labor associated with 
the ERO are considered, assuming that fured costs for the systems associated with eitha 
alternative are the same. 
41 
Simulation is used to evaluate total cost distribution outcomes of the decision alternatives. 
This my, the probabilities associated with the expected values of the decision alternatives are 
used to make more informed decisions, not just the expected values alone. The simulation is 
based on the frequency distributions of the input parameters. Frequency distributions of the 
MIMMS data are constructed fiom the costs (replacement parts and direct labor hours) fields fkom 
each ERO in the sample. These frequency distributions are then run through "Best Fit," a 
statistical software package cvhich provides the descriptive statistics and most likely distributions 
of the data Once the cost distributions are obtained, they can then be input into the appropriate 
cost equations and run through commercial software such as "Crystal Ball" (Decisioneering, 1993) 
or "@sk", which are spreadsheet add-in programs. These programs run automatic "Monte 
Carlo" simulation on the input parameters to provide a solution owput distribution. The output 
distribution is more meaningful for decision making than deterministic values. In the case of the 
MIMMS-AIS data, the labor hour and ERO cost data are run through Best Fit to obtain the input 
distribution for use with Crystal Ball. For the purposes of this thesis, only labor and replacement 
parts costs are considered, assuming that overhead and fwd costs for either the "do-nothing" or 
overhaulhuy-new alternatives are the same. 
The cost per system failure C,, obtained fiom the ERO cost distributions, is defined as: 
where C, is the cost of all replacement parts applied to the ERO, and is the cost of direct 
labor. Direct labor hours are recorded on the ERO, and reflect the total mechanic-hours used to 
restore the system It is not necessary to assume that one or lrnrr mechanics pex+ormed the repairs 
to compute total labor hour costs. Note that labor costs are not recorded on the ERO rather, 
labor hours. Labor costs are derived based on several assumptions. Here, it is assumed that 
equipment is repaired by Mirines of rank E3 through E5, with probabilities of 0.45,0.35 and 0.20 
respectively, that each rank pe&.orms repairs. Therefore, a %ei@ted" labor rate based on the 
composite hourly rates times the probabilities above is used to calculate labor costs for each ERO. 
The composite hourly rates for paygrades E3, I3 and E5 are $10.29, $12.33, and $14.46, 
respectively. The weighting factors above are based on the approximate ratios of these ranks 
within a typical maintenance shop; therefore the weighted rate used is $ll.Mhour. Pay and 
benefits data is based on FY90 dollars (MCO W000.14,1991). 
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The total costs for a h e  projected period (CJ is determined by the expected number 
of failures times the cost per failure C,, plus scheduled maintenance costs, C,, or: 
where V(t) is given in equation (2-8). This formula is used to calculate the annual maintenance 
costs of the do-nothing alternative. 
C MIMiWDATAPREPARATION 
The analysis of the MIMMS-AIS data was done on a personal computer, using a 
combination of Microsoft Query, a database program, and Microsoft Excel, a spreadsheet program. 
The query program is used to further refine and filter the data prior to use with the spreadsheet. 
The spreadsheet program is used for ease of computations and graphical plotting. 
In order to conduct the analysis, the raw MIMM-AIS data has to be converted to a 
spreadsheet format. The most important data for the reliability analysis is the time to system 
failures (ITSF), which in the case of MIMMS-AIS is the primary meter-reading (equipment 
operating time) field Other relevent data is needed to segregate fleet populations, such as 
WestPac equipment fi.0mU.S. East Coast equipment, since systems in different geographic regions 
will show different failure patterns. Other MIMEVIS-AIS data such as parts replacements, parts 
costs, and labor hours are needed in order to compute the cost distributions associated with system 
failures. The following database fields are needed to conduct the analysis presented in this model: 
Field Name Description 
RAC Geographic Regional Activity Code. 
ITEM The equipment type, designated by its nomenclature, or identification 
number, model number or other descriptive information. 
The equipment serial number. SERIAL # 
DATERECIN The date the Equipment Repar Order was initiated, and the equipment 
was received in shop for repairs. 








The meter readmg (mileage). Chapter ID discussed the fact that this 
should be the mileage at failure. however. MIMMS reflects the mileage 
at restoration. These records represent the system TTSF, for the system. 
The r e p  parts used to restore the system. Presumably, parts are 
replaced due to wearout/failure. 
Quantity of parts replaced. This is multiplied by the parts cost to obtain 
total cost of a particular component type replacement. 
Charges for replacement parts. Note that a factor of 40% is used for 
secondary repairables, such as engines and transmissions, since the cost 
in MIMMS-AIS reflects the price of a new secondary repairable. In 
practice, the large majority of these are rebuilt for about 40% of the new 
cost. (TACOM 1985) 
Total direct labor hours evnded  during repairs under each ERO. 
Echelon of repair of the ERO. Note that only 2nd echelon EROs should 
be used to compute IITSF; mileages for higher u echelon repairs should 
not be included. 3rd and 4th echelon repairs are presumed to be due to 
the same failure which initiated the 2nd echelon ERO. 
Other MIMMS-AIS fields and separate computed fields (such as requisition lead-times, 
logistic delay times, etc.) may be used for more detailed analysis. Since data rmrds are 
displayed as spreadsheet rows, logic flags are used in the spreadsheet to differentiate rmrds 
associated with the EROs or serial numbers contained in the previous record. Appendix A 
presents the logic flags used in the spreadsheet to fbrther filter the data, and to count rmrds 
meeting specified criteria. 
1. segregate Different Populations 
In order to obtain meaningfur results, the sample population of the system in question 
should be as homogeneous as possible. When setting up the data for analysis, any database codes, 
fields or flags that distinguish between the system manufacturing date, location, variant, or model 
number should be segregated, depending on the comparability of the items. In the case of the 
HMMwcrs, the Marine Corps has many different variants which are used under different 
operating conditions. For example, even the data for a single variant, such as the h4998, includes 
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both the "generic" vehicles. and radio variants which will show much different operating 
characteristics from each other, such as mileage or engine wear. Further. major geographic or 
regional factors may need to be considered, since environmental conditions will have varying 
degrees of effect on the life of the equipment. Therefore, the analysis may require the data on 
like systems to be filtered into homogeneous populations prior to drawing any meanin@ 
conclusions. 
2. EliminateQuestionabieData 
Chapter III discussed problems with MIMMS-AIS meter reading data. Prior to conducting 
any of the analysis requiring system TTSFs, suspect data should be filtered out. Logic flags are 
used in the spreadsheet to highlight: 
0 "Suspect1' meter readings of "999999," "0" or "1" miles. 
Meter readings which are less than the prior meter reading on the same system 
Meter readings that are unreasonably higher than the prior meter readings. Such 
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entries are often due to the tenth digit being included when the mileage was 
recorded in MIMMS, e. g. an odometer reading of 17 184.3 was incorrectly entered 
as 171843 miles. (Refer to Chapter III, section C). 
3. Perfom Paneto Analysis 
The decision to overhaul or replace a system is based on the assumption that the existing 
system is deteriorating beyond economical repairs. If only a few components are contributing to 
the causes of the system failures, then the attention should be focused on improving the reliability 
of those few but vital components. Crow's (1975) MLEs discussed in Chapter II assumes that the 
system is sufficiently complex and that no single part or groups of parts contribute to the majority 
of the system failures. The MIMMS replacement part data is analyzed using Pareto analysis, and 
the results provide the basis for the validity of that assumption. As Chapter III showed, the Pareto 
analysis on the HMMWV indicated that the "sufficiently complex" assumption could be used. 
4. Perfom T ~ n d  Testing 
Eguation (2-9) provides the LaPlace test statistic 0 which indicates trends in the failure 
data. Prior to making assumptions about an HPP or NHPP failure rate, this statistic should be 
computed for the systems in the population. A graphical plot of the cumulative times to failure 
versus cumulative number of failures will also indicate whether a system is improving, in a 
steady-state, or deteriorating. 
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5. cOmputeMIEs~andhandcOnfidenceBo~ 
Equations (2-12) and (2-13) are used to compute the conditional MLEs for p and h for 
time truncated data. Confidence bounds for p are given by equations (2-14) and (2-15); 
confidence bounds for h by equations (2-16) and (2-17). The inpa data consists of the Total 
Time to System Failure (?TSF,) data for each i-th failure for each q-th system 
The spreadsheet format on the next page contains the formulas used in the model for 
determining MLEs for and A, along with their respective upper and lower confidence limts for 
a sample population. It contains simulated failure times (ITSF,) for K=3 systems and N=10 
failures each To use the model, the lTSF,s for each system are copied from the MIMMS-AIS 
data and inserted into the appropriate columns with the "lTSFi" headmgs. All other values are 
automatically calculated based on the time truncated, conditional MLE formulas and x2 confidence 
intervals presented in Chapter II. The number of columns can be copied for as many systems as 
required subject to the limitations of the software and computer memory. 
When data is not available fi-om the system "birth" (To = 0), the TTSF,s must be rescaled 
as discussed in Chapter II. The data for the three Sample systems was purposely designed to show 
one system with an "improving" failure rate, one with a constant failure rate, and one with a 
deteriorating failure rate. 
The spreadsheet computes the individual system MLEs for p and 5 which are recorded 
just below the system serial numbers. At the top of the spreadsheet, the pooled values of p and 
hare provided for the entire sample. The pooled values are used to compute the ROCOF for the 
sample population. If the individual systems show a wide range of differences, it m y  not be 
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I WIIYIIIIYI In(TTSFi) TTSFI'P 
1 2 197 8294 3580992 
1 1504 8987 860179 
1 1099 9393 1436207 
1 0811 9680 2066209 
1 0588 9903 2739652 
1 0405 10086 3449868 
1 0251 10240 4192199 
1 0118 10373 4963177 





half of the systems show "improving" trends in the failure data cvhile the other half were 
deteriorating, the MLE for p would probably be very close to one. indicating a fleet-wide linear 
failure intensity. Therefore. additional analysis would be required to determine the causes of the 
differences in the failure intensities (i.e., operating conditions or age) of the equipment. 
A plot of the simulated data for the three systems represented in the spreadsheet is 
presented in Figure 4.2. The plot is provided to illustrate the shapes of the cumulative failure 
curves based on systems at various stages in their life-cycles, and is usell for estimating the 
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FIG 4.2 Sample F d m  Hob for Simulated Data 
As shown in Figure 4.2, System #1 is deteriorating, since it has an increasing failure 
intensity based on output fiom the spreadsheet model. Its value for p = 2.24, and Laplace 
0 = 1.57. Graphically, the IITSFis show a convex cumulative failure curve with respect to the 
origin. System #2 has p = 0.87 and U = -1.38, indicating a decreasing failure rate (system 
improvement); and graphically has a curve concave to the origin System #3 has p = 1.2, 
indicating a nearly linear failure rate, and U = 0, indicating no trend in the failure arrival patterns. 
In general, the "status" of a system during its lifecycle can be described based on the values of 
Uand s- * as shown in Table 4.1: 
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fife-Cycle Phase 
Bum-in, debugging, work- 
hardening 
Useful life/ random failures 
~~ 
Deterioration 
p value M a c e  Test Sortistic (U) 
u < o  
B E 1  u = o  
Table 4.1 Interpretations of Values for p and U 
The data truncation of the TTSF,'s and TISF,'s must be considered for the systems in 
order to reach meaningful conclusions. For example, comparing failure truncated data on a system 
with ten failures between zero and 20,000 miles with another system which had ten failures 
between 80,000 to 90,OOO miles would not result in meaningful conclusions (Crow,1975). The 
first system might be in its "bum-in" phase and would show an improving ROCOF, while the 
second system may be in a deterioration phase and would show a deteriorating ROCOF. In both 
cases, the true values of p and h would be different. Evaluating "brackets" of TTSF data for the 
same systems over different intervals in the life-cycle will yield different values for p and 3\, as 
the "bathtub" curve shown in Chapter II indicates. For this analysis, time truncated data for only 
those vehicles with sufficiently high mileages (vehicles with more than 40,000 miles) is used, so 
that the systems used to derive the MLEs are assumed to be in the same phase of their life-cycle. 
As a further check, a companson of the vehicle-by-vehicle LaPlace statistic may be used to ensure 
that systems are in the same phase of their life-cycles, prior to drawing conclusions. 
Once the MLEs of p and h are obtained, the ROCOF p(t), given in equation (2-6) can 
be defined Ifthe LaPlace test statistic indicates that a system is deteriorating, it is assumed that 
the system will continue to deteriorate at the rate p(t) even when minimal repairs are performed. 
The expected number of failures are then extrapolated using V(t) for a future period of time. 
Equation (3-2) can be used to forecast fbture costs over intervals, such as simulated annual 
mileage equivalents. A distribution of annual mileage equivalents can be approximated h m  the 
49 
MIMR/Is data by computing the difference between individual vehicle meter readings over 365 
day periods. For this thesis. it is assumed that if the system is deteriorating, that the ROCOF p(t), 
can be extrapolated using the same values for p and hover a reasonable number of h e  periods 
(Saia 1978). 
1. Cost Stteam Assumpt~ons for the Present System 
Ifthe system is deteriorating, it is assumed that maintenance costs will increase rapidly 
under the "do-nothing" alternative. Fuel, crew. and overhead costs such as facilities and war 
reserve spares costs are assumed to be the same for either alternative, so they are not considered 
in this analysis. If they are not the same for each alternative, then the additional costs/saVings 
must be reflected in the break-even analysis. The "failure" cost is defmed in equation (4- 1). The 
forecasted annual maintenance cost is defmed in quation (4-2) as the number of expected failures 
per year times the cost per failure plus scheduled maintenance costs. For this model, semi-annual 
scheduled preventative maintenance is assumed. The expected number of annual failures is driven 
by forecasted annual mileage. Of course, annual mileage varies Widely for individual vehicles and 
among fleets of vehicles, therefore a distribution of annual mileage is used as an input variable 
into the total cost equation, and evaluated using the "Crystal Ball" software or other simulation 
techniques. For example, the annual mileage distribution fiom the MTMMS data on the 
HMMWVS was run through Best Fit, resulting in a Lognormal distribution With p = 6970, and 
G= 7650 miles. Other assumptions include: 
8 The distribution and parameter values of the input variables based on the MIh4MS 
Nominal discount factors for net present value analysis are obtained fiom OME3 
Costs are in then-year dollars. 
data are presented in Appendix B. 
0 
Circular A-94 annual supplement ( O m ,  1993). 
2. Cost S h u n  Assumptions for the Overhauv Buy New Altedves 
The decision whether to keep the current system and continue to perform minimal repairs 
(the "do-nothing" alternative) or to buy or overhaul can be made using break-even analysis of the 
O&M cash flows. Although cost estimates may be available for the unit costs of rebuild or buy- 
new options, estimates about annual O&M costs for those alternatives may not be available, 
therefore a few assumptions need to be stated. For this analysis, the annual O M  costs associated 
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with the overhaul alternative are assumed to be the same as when the system was "new." The 
same cost stream starting at To (not including inflation factors) is then added to the cost of 
overhaul. and is used for that alternative. The effect of the life extension is most likely b o w  
but may be estimated as 80% of the origrnal usefid life. 
Ideally, the reliability data and costs of the existing system would be used to compute the 
reliability and costs after its overhaul. That is, the same failure intensity for the on@ system 
would apply after overhaul, reset to "as new" or To, given that brand new but same components 
are replaced. (In most cases, better quality parts or component improvements are replaced during 
overhaul). Since O&M costs are not known for the system after overhaul, the relationship used 
by the U.S. Army TACOM shown in equation (4-3) is used to estimate the us new HMMWV 
O&M costs reset to To (TACOM, 1989). For the HMMwv, the annual cost equation is: 
C =[mA+ b ] ~  + k (4-3) 
the values given for the M998 HMMWV for the variables are: 
m: slope = .0554 
b constant = .1436 $/year 
k constant =318$/year 
A: Age 
x mileage: mileage is simulated using annual mileage equivalents, as discussed 
= age of the vehicle in years 
in the previous section. 
Equation (4-3) above does account for k l ,  crew and other costs, however since these 
costs are reflected in all three variables (slope, intercept, constant), there is no way to rescale this 
equation to only reflect parts and labor (i.e., direct maintenance) charges. Since it is the only data 
available to approximate HMMWV costs since To= 0, then it is used as the best available cost 
comparison. Ideally, the system's actual lifecycle costs would be known for such analysis. 
3. Ro@I%4.h&s 
Equation (2- 18) provides the o w  overhaul/replace time, which minimizes the expected 
maintenance costs of minimal repairs (Barlow and Proschan, 1965). It is an extremely simplified 
equation, and should only be used as a guage for rough estimates. The parameters p and h which 
were calculated earlier are input into (2-19) and the optunal system replacement interval TC is 
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obtained. Equation (2-19) similarly, is a highly simplified equation which approximates the 
estimated life expectency of a system based on linearly increasing annual maintenance costs. 
These figures can be used as a check to the break-even analysis, but should not be used 
exclusively for decision malung purposes. 
E SUMMARY 
Mkintenance data from MIMMS-AIS can be used to estimate the failure intensity of 
Marine Corps systems. using the spreadsheet model presented in this chapter. MLEs for the 
parameters of the ROCOF can be used to forecast the expected number of failures over fixture 
intervals. The MIMMS-AIS data also provides measures of the direct costs of failures, which are 
multiplied by the expected number of failures to obtain total annual cost forecasts for systems. 
The advantage to using the ROCOF forecast for fiture periods rather than sunple linear 
approximation methods is that deterioration may cause failures to OCCUT at increasing rates, in 
which case an exponential relationship may provide a more accurrate basis for decision making. 
Using the forecasted cost streams, break-even analysis can be used for decision making between 
the "denothing," overhaul, or buy-new alternatives. The next chapter presents a case analysis of 
this model using MIMMS-AIS data for a sample population of HMMWVs from West Coast 
Marine Corps units. 
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V. CASE ANALYSE OF HMMWV FAILURE DATA 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an example of the model presented in Chapter 
IV applied to MIMMS data on the M998A1 series HMMWV. The HMMWV is currently in its 
mid-lifecycle in the Marine Corps; most of the HMMWVs are roughly eight years old An 
extended service-life program (ESP) is currently being programmed for the HMMWV fleet, which 
includes a block upgrade of most major components. Applying this model could validate the need 
and identlfy a time horizon when the ESP becomes economically desirable. For the purposes of 
this chapter, the ESP is referred to in terms of "overhaul," although it actually entails more than 
the overhaul, as defined in Chapter II. The objectives include; 1) identa whether the sample of 
HMMWVs shows any trend in the failure data, 2) computation of the parameters p and 34 so that 
expected failures and failure intensities can be estimated, 3) provide supporting estimates to help 
the program managers make a decision about when to pedorm the ESP. 
K EmrmAnoN OF'MEHlWWW RA'IE OF ocIcuRRF=NcE OFFFAILURES 
This section discusses the process described in Chapter IV section B, 1, which is USBd to 
convert the MlMMS data into a form that can be used to obtain the MLEs needed to estimate the 
ROCOF and expected failure functions. 
1. lWlMlW-~Datapreparation 
The first step is to filter the MIMMS-ATS data to a form that can be used with the A45.E 
.&timation Spmdheet model to compute the individual system MLEs, "pooled" sample MLEs, 
and the LaPlace test statistics. The specific data requested for this thesis were the MMMS-AIS 
database records for "critical maintenance" EROs on the M998 HMMWV. It is assumed that parts 
with "Combat Essentiality code" (CEC) = 0, 1,5, or 6 would cause system operational mission 
failures ifthey failed Further, Material Usage code = "7" was specified (repair parts and 
secondary rep;urables). The other MUG spec@ scheduled maintenance parts (such as filters), 
collateral equipment, and modifications; these do not constitute mission critical system fa i lm.  
All maintenance category codes were included in the initial query. All maintenance category 
codes were included, althougb only maintenance category codes Y4"' and TP" in MtMMS reflect 
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critical maintenance, however these stam codes are normally downgraded to "routine" after the 
critical r e p  are completed and prior to closing the ERO, as discussed in Chapter III. 
Records with suspect meter-readings were filtered out prior to analysis, since these cause 
erroneous failure results. Lastly, ERG that showed a defect-code indicating that the primary 
meter was replaced were deleted &om the data file prior to analysis. In all, roughly 25% of the 
raw data was purged before any analysis even started 
The data file used for this thesis contained records only for the U.S. West Coast regional 
units. After eliminating the "bad" data, a total of 3040 records representing 276 Unique vehicle 
serial numbers resulted. ?he 3040 total records reflects both the fact that most serial numbers had 
multiple ERO history files over the 54 month sample period, and that most EROs had multiple 
replacement parts (which are separate database records) recorded agamst them 
The database records appear as rows in both the Query and Excel (spreadsheet) s o h e ,  
which represent either unique Equipment Repair Order (ERO) records, or the parts ordered under 
the ERO. (One ERO is always associated with one serial number for principal end items). For 
example, if seven different parts were requisitioned under one ERO, seven "rows" of data will 
appear all with the same ERO and equipment serial number in the spreadsheet. These records will 
al l  show the same meter-reading, labor-hours and open and closed dates for the ERO. The parts- 
trailer records (i.e., part name, cost, orderdate) are unique for those parts. To illustrate, an 
extract of seven fields from the raw data is provided below. 'Ihe extract shows how the raw data 
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'Ihe fust three records in the above sample all pertain to a unique ERO on the same serial 
n u m k  (532282), under which three paas were ordered The fourth record is for a new ERO on 
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serial number 532282. The tenth record is a unique serial number (532284) and a Unique EXO, 
and starts a new data record. 
The next step was to sort the entire database by; 1) serial number, 2) date-received-in- 
shop, 3) primary meter reading. Although Chapter III discussed problems with the EX0 open and 
close dates and the order in which the meter readings would appear. it tuned out to be easier 
simply to sort the meter readings for each serial number in ascending sequence. ?his procedure 
does not violate the chronological ordering discussed in Chapter II, since the meter readings 
increase with timdusage. The chronological sequence of the various open and close dates of the 
EROs becomes too much of an administrative burden to be concerned w i ~  and does not have 
an impact on the failure data. 
Four primary logic counters were used either to count records that met a criteria, or as 






P E  
Distinguishes unique EROs and unique serial numbas. 
Values are "2" if the record is both a unique ERO and 
serial number than the previous record "1" if the record 
is a unique ERO but same serial number as previous 
record; "0" if the record is a parts-trailer for the same 
ERO as the previous record 
Compares the date closed of the next unique ERO number 
to the open date of the current ERO record; used to 
highlight suspect data. 
Counters wed to indicate the total number of failures 
accrued for a unique serial number. This criteria is used 
to find serial numbers with p t e r  than or equal to W" 
failures in order to obtain failure truncated data. 
Accumulates the total cost of parts on an ERO-by-ERO 
basis. Straight parts charges for individual items are 
contained in the raw MIMMS-AIS data, and need to be 
summed for each ERO. 
Other minor conversions are required, such as for Julian dates, parts costs and labor-hours. 
These formulas are provided in Appendix A. 
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Once the data is prepared, the next step is to identie serial numbers with sufficient usage 
and a sufficient number of failures to obtain the MLEs for p and h There is a tradeoff between 
the number of unique vehicle serial numbers (K) which have a specified numkr of recorded 
failures needed to obtain confident p l e d  MLEs, and the numkr of observed failures (N) 
recorded against each serial number. The greater the value of N desired, the smaller the number 
K of serial numbers will meet that criteria in the database. For N too low, the MLE results are 
meaningless. The key is to select a data set which yields reasonably high values for N and K. 
since the degrees of freedom that determine the confidence intervals around the MLEs are 
determined by the total number of pooled failures (M). Recall that equations (2-14) through (2- 
17) are the lower and upper confidence limits for p and h, respectively, and all have degrees of 
fi-eedom driven by M 
In Excel, the "AutoFilter" option allows such queries to be performed easily. To get an 
idea of the range of data, first records are filtered with "greater than" specified mileages, for 
example, show records with grater than 50,000 miles. This step provides a basis for where the 
data should be time truncated for the analysis. The next step is to identify individual system serial 
numbers with a certain number of failures, e.g., N 2 8 failures. This is done by setting the criteria 
for the I t#  FAILURES" column to a specified value. Within the file used for this thesis, among 
the 276 Unique serial numbers, only 19 of those showed greater than seven mission critical failures 
recorded. Only two serial numben showed N 2 10 failures. The tradeoff of K and N for this 
analysis resulted in K = 32 system with N 2 6 failures each. Any less than sbc failure 
observations would not have allowed for a meanin@ analysis, since trends in the total time to 
system failure data (?TSFis) would not be apparent based on fewer data points. 
Finally, the meter reading data (TTSFp) for each of the K = 32 serial numbers with N 2 
6 failures was extracted fiom the data file, and copied into the MLE estimation spreadsheet similar 
to the one presented in Chapter IV. 
A separate database file provided by the HMMWV inventory manager contained 
mandacturing and fielding dates of the Marine Corps' HMMwVs. A query for these 32 serial 
numbers indicated that all of them were fielded during 1986. Since all of the systems are the 
same age (eight years old) and operated in West Coast Fleet Marine Force Units, it is assumed 
that they all are in roughly the same stage of their life-cycle. 
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2. Investigate for Dominant Failm C h s e s  
Prior to begbmhg any detailed trend or reliability analysis, primary failure causes are 
investigated in order to eliminate the potential for making unnecessary program decisions. One 
purpose is to establish that the system under question is sufficiently complex enough to use the 
assumptions stated in Chapter ID. Another reason is to avoid making a decision to overhaul or 
replace a system due to fi-equent failures, when the primary cause of those failures may be due 
to a few but critical substandard components. For this thesis, a Pareto analysis was done for all 
of the parts in the database. This process was simplified using the "Pivot Table" add-in program 
in Excel. which creates a transposed array of specified data fields, and automatically totals any 
fields desired, either vertically or horizontally. Using the pivot-table add-in, the sample data was 
used to create a Pareto distribution of parts sorted by usage. Appendix C Contains the results of 
the Pareto analysis. 
3. Computation of the Miximum Likelihood Estimators for p and h 
Maximum likelihood estimates of p and h for each system were obtained using the MLE 
Estimate Spreadsheet presented in Chapter IV, based on the ?TSF data for the K=32 systems. 
The box at the top of the spreadsheet shows the pooled MLEs for the sample population. An 
extract of the MLE estimation spreadsheet for this data set is contained in Appendix B. Values 




m MIE u a  
4.3 x 1 0 7  5.0 x 107 5.7 x 1 0 7  
1.393 1.597 1.812 
Table 5.1 Conditional Pooled MLJh for the Sample 
4. T~endAnalysis 
chapter IV i n t r o d d  the sample MUE testbation spreadsheet which computed the 
LaPlace test statistic (U) for trends of the TISF, data, based on equation (2-9). Two systems of 
the 32 total systems had LaPlace statistics indicating decreasing failure rates (DFR), or U < 0. 
Speculation might suggest that these two serial numbers might be vehicles assigned to unit 
commanding Oflicers. Traditionally, Marine Corps motor-pools tend to place the highest 
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emphasis on the CO's vehicle. All of the other systems had Laplace statistics indicating system 
deterioration, or increasing failure rates (IFR), where U > 0. Results are summanzed ' in Table 5.2. 
Plots of the mileage to cumulative failures (see Appendix B) also indicated increasing failure rates. 
Based on the predominant positive values of the LaPlace statistics for the individual systems, the 
conclusion is that this HMMWV sample population is deteriorating. The NHPP assumption is 
made regarding the failure intensity of the sample population, and therefore the ROCOF model 





































































































































Table 5.2 Individual System MLEs and M a c e  SGltiStic~ 
IFR = increasing failure rate, DFR = decreasing failure rate. 
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the increasing failure rate associated with the pooled values obtained 
for p and h They provide a graphical method for estimating the number of failures as mileage 
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FIgm 5.1 Pooled Sample Failm Intensity 
and Figure 5.2 shows the expected number of cumulative failures: 
I 
0 1  I 
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Mileage 
FIgm 5.2 Expected Failutes 
59 
C COST ANALYSIS OF THE MXERNATMB 
Cost analysis of the "do-nothing" or overhaul decision alternatives is done using a net- 
present-value ("V) comparison of the two estimated maintenance cost streams. For a starting 
point. a seventeen year economic mefuZ Zfe was assumed (USMC, 1994). Assurning that overhaul 
adds an additional 80% of seventeen years to the present age (i.e., eight years old in 1994), a 
fourteen year extended life was used as the period for the decision. In other words, the cost- 
streams would be compared over a fourteen year life, starting in 1994. 
1. Assumptions About Input VariaMes 
Cost variables, or factors that derive cost variables, such as annual mileage, were defined 
as statistical distribution for use with the Crystal Ball add-in. The input variables in the 
spreadsheet are referred to as assumption cells in Crystal Ball. As stated earlier. the distributions 
for these were derived from empirical cost data from the MLMRIIS-AIS data files. Reasonable 
bounds were placed on the ranges of the assumption variables, based on the author's judgement. 
In most cases, the upper bound was set at three standard deviations for the particular assumption 
variable, and the lower bound set as the minimum, non-zero value observed in the sample wed 
to derive the assumption variable. Table 5.3 summarizes the input variables and assumptions used 




Unscheduled Maintenance Cos 
per ERO 
Labor Hours per ERO 
Unscheduled Maintenance 
Scheduled Maintenance labor 
hours per ERO 
Scheduled Maintenance cost 
per ERO 













~ 4 9 7 0  miles, -7650 miles 
Likeliest = $982 
Likeliest = 7.03 hours 
p= 1.81 hours, -1.45 hours' 
Likeliest = $82 
Likeliest = $1 1.84hour 
$23,400 - $32,600 
Likeliest = 1.60 
Table 5.3 Input Variable Assumptions 
Several difficulties were encountered regarding data for the input variables. First, overhaul 
costs were difficult to obtain on the HMMWV because of proprietary business data. The Army 
and Marine Corps Logistics Depots are in competition with each other and private contractors to 
perform depot level maintenance on equipment. One source (U.S. Army, 1994) provided a range 
of costs for the HMMWV rebuild vs CUCV re-buy program decision. Another "anonymous" 
source provided a likely range for rebuild costs. These two estimates together comprise the 
overhaul cost assumptions. Secondly, since MIMMS-AIS data does not exist for the HMMWV 
prior to 1990, the ongird reliability and life-cycle maintenance costs could not be determined for 
use as the "after overhaul" reliability/cost assumptions. Costs are known for the period 1990 to 
1994 based on the MlMMs data, but this period was shown to be during the wewoutphcrre of 
the system, therefore these costs may not reflect the reliability of the system over the first eight 
total years of life. For this reason, the cost relationship used by the U.S. Army (TACOM, 1989) 
TWVULDP shown in equation (4-3) was used to reflect the maintenance cost after overhaul, 
starting with time reset to zero. Ideally, the estimated reliability function starting at time equals 
zero would be used to approximate the maintenance cost-stream after overhaul. Lastly, cost 
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estimates were not available for a fleet-wide HMMWV replacement, therefore that alternative was 
not analyzed. In any case, the same approach as in the overhaul alternatives would be used to 
analyze the by-new option. 
2. 
F U E C ~ Y ~  Cells are defined as the oulput, or solution cells that are being solved for to 
Assumptions About the Output Fomasts 
assist with decision making. In this case, five forecast cells were defined: 
NPV of the "do-nothing" option, 
NPVs of the cost-streams associated with the 1994, 1996, and 1997 overhaul 
scenarios. The cost-streams represent the net difference between the cost of 
overhaul minus the cost of the do-nothing values for each year during the 14 year 
life-cycle periods. 
Computed value of ttOptltnal Replacement Interval" (T*) based on equation 
Computed value of the Life Expectancy (LJ based on equation (2-19). 
(2-18). 
Mer the NPV spreadsheet was constructed, the Crystal Ball macro was run for 1,OOO 
iterations. ?he macro generates statistics for the output or forecart cells, and displays forecast 
histograms. The results of the 1,OOO iterations are provided in the "Crystal Ball Report" in 
Appendix B, but is summanzed * in Section D to follow. 
3. CostMbdeISetlq 
?he spreadsheet on page 65 shows the setup of the cost analysis. Input variables are 
highlighted in bold numbers, and appear as the means of the inpa distributions for the cost 
assumpfions. All other cells are calculated by spreadsheet formdas. The number of critical 
failures per year is derived by evaluating equation (5-3) over each a n n d  mileage equivalent 
interval. The NPVs shown on the spreadsheet are computed using the standard method, and 
represent a fourteen year period. The frequency charts generated by Crystal Ball provide a basis 
for evaluating the range of valws for each of the forecast cells. Note that all of the dollar values 
appearing on the spreadsheet represent costs. 
"he pooled MLEs shown in Table 5.1 are used to define the ROCOF of the sample, and 
are used to forecast expected failures in the W e .  since the pooled MLE value for p is greater 
than one, the cumulative number of failures will increase at an increasing rate with usage, thus 
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causing maintenance costs to increase rapidly. Equation (5-2) gives the pooled estimate of the 
ROCOF, where: 
p(t) = (5.09 x 103(1.597)(t0.59') (5-2) 
and the e'xpected number of faiiures in the interval (t, t+dt) is evaluated as a definite integral, 
Equation (5-3) is used in the spreadsheet cost model (presented in the next section) to forecast the 
expected number of failures over future annual intervals. 
The conversion of mileage to calendar time is done using an annual mileage distribution, 
discussed in Chapter IV. The mileage distribution was input as an assumption variable for use 
with the Crystal Ball add-in, and used for calculating values of cells containing mileage figures. 
such as equation (5-3) above. The value for the mileage used with the do-nothing alternative was 
rescaled to reflect (annual mileage) x (8 years) so that the resulting expected number of failures 
would represent the system's actual age. With estimates of the ROCOF and expected failure 
functions defined, projected maintenance costs can now be forecasted for annual mileage 
equivalents. 
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I CateOory Mean Sample Distrlbulvn Assurnptlon Amual Mileago 8.070 -lognormal 
CM Cost Per ERO $ 
Unsched labor hourslERO 
Sched PM labor houcs/ERO 
Sched Maint Costs Per ERO $ 
D i m 1  Rate 









E3 E4 E5 'Weighted rate' 
1.587 -Triangular (use LCL=lo lo UCL=hi) 
10.28 $ 12.33 $ 14.46 $ 11.84 
4.89E-07 -unbnn (use LCL=lo lo UCL=hi) 
TACOM Estimate (Annual) =(.0554'Age t .1436)'Mileage t $318 
Overhaul Cost S 28,000 -Uniform 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 
4 4 4 4 
4.079 4.381 4,669 -4.945 
Cunulative -4.079 6.460 -13.129 -18,074 
# c ~ i t ~ c a l  failures: 
NPVDonothhg -52.006 
-27.319 -1.705 -2.091 -2.477 
cumulative costs -27,319 -29.024 -31.115 -33.592 
NPV1994plM -58.076 
QYNt&lLLl%§ 4.079 4.381 -27.319 -1.705 
cumulative casts -4,079 6.460 -35.779 -37.484 
NPV 1996plM -53.938 - 4,079 4.381 4.669 -27.319 
cumulative costs -4.079 -8.460 -13,129 -40.448 
NPV 1997plsn -52.631 
T'= 84.913 op~mun ovwhad ntarval 
based on equatvn (2-29) 
7 3 more years from prescnl 












1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 
-5.467. -5.716 -5,957 6.191 6.420 6.642 6.860 -7,073 -7,282 -7.487 
-28.752 -34.468 -40.425 -46.616 -53,036 -59,678 66,539 -73.612 80.894 -88,381 
-3,250 -3,636 4.022 4,408 -4.794 -5.180 -5,953 -6.339 -6.725 -7,111 
-39.705 -43.341 47.363 -51.771 -56.565 61.745 67.698 -74,037 80.761 -87.872 
-2.477 -2.863 -3.250 -3.636 4,022 4.408 -4,794 -5,180 -5.953 6 ,339 
-42.052 44.916 48.165 -51.801 -55.823 -60.231 -65.025 -70.205 -76.158 -82.496 
-2.091 -2,477 -2.863 -3,250 -3.636 4.022 -4.408 4.794 -5.180 -5.953 
44.244 46,721 -49.585 -52.834 -56,470 -60,492 -64,900 69.694 -74.674 -80.827 
NeI dflerenca between Do- 6.070 -23.240 2.676 2.578 2.468 2.347 2.210 2.080 1.935 1.783 1.625 1.462 908 735 557 376 
nothii and 1994 ovamaul 0.38% IRR 
Net difference between Do- -1,932 0 0 -22.650 3,240 3.120 2.990 2.852 2,707 2,555 2.398 2,234 2.066 1.893 1.330 1.148 
nothii  and 1996 overhaul 
NeI difference between Do- -625 0 0 0 -22.374 3,506 3,376 3,238 3.093 2,942 2.784 2,621 2,452 2.279 2.102 1,534 
nolhii and 1997 overhaul 
4.40% IRR 
6.88% IRR 
Cumulative (annual) Miles , 48790 55760 62730 69700 76670 83640 90610 97580 104550 111520 118490 125460 132430 139400 146370 153340 
The spreadsheet shows four cost streams computed. All figures are expressed as costs. 
The f i  is the "do-nothing1 alternative, which is calculated for a fourteen year period from the 
present. The other cost-streams represent performing the overhaul during 1994, 1996 and 1997. 
respectively. The WVs of the cost streams are computed for all three alternatives based on OMB 
Circular A-94 (Om, 1993) n o d  discount rates. Internal Rate of Return (IRR) figures are 
provided based on the difference between the cost of performing the overhaul and the cost of the 
do-nothing policy. The IRR is used as a "tie-breaker" between decision alternatives, and provides 
an idea about the direction in which the costs of the alternatives are moving, i.e., the IRR 
increases as the overhaul is deferred. 
D. ANALYSIS OFRFSCTL'IS 
The do-nothing alternative is the preferred option by a close margin, based on the static 
The NPVs computed for each valws of the cost estimates for each assumption variable. 
alternative over the next 14 year period are: 
Do-Nothing: -$52,006 
Overhaul in 1994: -$58,076 
Overhaul in 1996: -$53,938 
overhaul in 1997: -$52,631 
As the overhaul is deferred into the firture, performing the overhaul becomes the p r e f e r r e d  
alternative, assuming that costs remain constant. 
Since each of the cost variables are associated with their own distributions, the forecast 
values, such as NPV, are all reflected by unique distributions. The probable range and shape of 
the forecast distribution is generated by simulation. The Crystal Ball simulation was used to 
1,OOO iterations to generate the NPVs of the decision alternatives. The simdalion results validate 
that defening the overhaul until after 1997 is preferred, based on the range and  measure^ of 
central tendency of the alternatives. Results of the simulation are summarrzed . in Table 5.4: 
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II Do-Nothing I 1 4106.633 I -$28,200 I 416.363 11 
1997 Scenario 
11 1994 Scenario I 0.4% I -$54,192 I 447,675 I 440.220 II 
5.9% -$50.429 I 446,448 $44,694 
11 1996 Scenario I 4.4% I -$51.234 I 446.498 I 438.172 11 
The mean value of the cost of the do-nothing alternative ($106,633) is high due to the fact that 
some high values of and high annual mileages can be generated based on their distribution 
shapes, and these are variables in the annual cost equation. Likewise, the median and mode for 
the do-nothing alternative are relatively low for the 14 year period because the simulation 
generates mostly low values for the assumption variables mileage, labor-hours, and p. The annual 
cost equation for the do-nothing alternative is particularly sensitive to the value of fi since it is 
an exponent and drives the number of expected failures. It is also sensitive to annual mileage, 
and the cost of overhaul. Cost ranges will be wide due to high variability in the annual mileage. 
The high cost of overhaul is ultimately the determining factor driving the decision, and since the 
cost is high, and the cost of the "minimal repam" maintenance policy does not increase 
dramatically, the decision alternative favors deferring overhaul into the m e .  
In comparison. the simulated NPVs increase as the overhaul is deferred into the lidme. 
The "static" NPV for the 1997 overhaul cost-stream is nearly identical to the cost of the dc+ 
nothing alternative, which implies that the cost-stream for overhaul during or after 1997 is more 
economical than doing nothing. Although the median and modal values are higher for the 
simulated overhaul NPVs than the do-nothing alternative, they have less range and variability in 
annual maintenance costs after overhaul, which leads to more confidence in the decision to 
perform the overhaul. 
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1. When to Overhaul? 
Unless there are operational reasons to overhaul or upgrade the HMMWV earlier, the 
optimal time to overhaul is between 1997 and 2001 when the NPV for the overhaul cost-stream 
begins to be less than the do-nothing cost-stream. Referring to the cost model spreadsheet, the 
net difference between the NPVs of the overhaul options and do-nothing decreases for each year 
the overhaul if deferred. After 1997, the net difference between the overhaul and do-nothing 
alternatives actually becomes a cost savings (which is not shown). The impact of any cost-savings 
could be significant, since there are over 14,000 HMMwvs in the active fleet. Even mar@ 
savings realized from deferring the overhaul are translated as potentially hundreds of thousands 
of maintenance dollars for the current fiscal year. 
'The rough estimate life-expectancy calculated fiom equation (2-19) indicates 
approximately a seven year period, measured from the present. Further, the optimum overhaul 
interval calculated by equation (2-18) is also shown in the spreadsheet, and indicates a 93,700 
mile interval, measured fiom time zero. Based on the cumulative a n n d  mileage assumptions, 
this value represents a period between 1999 and 2001, or seven years from the present. The mean 
of the optimum overhaul interval based on the simulation was 129,000 miles. The simulation 
output for these two estimates are provided in Appendix B, and indicate the range and shape of 
the distributions for these values. The results are summaflzed * in table 5.5: 
Mean Median 
optimal Overhul Interval 129,496 89,689 
(mile) 





Table 5.5 &ugh Estimates of Ophal Ovelhaul Interval and Iife Expectancy for the 
HMMWV 
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The mileages shown abve for the optimal overhaul interval correspond to a period between 1994 
and 2005 for the first overhaul, a wide range due to the high variability in annual mileage for 
different vehicles. The life expectancy values are approximately seven years, measured fiom the 
present, which implies that the economic overhaul period is during 2001. Again, it should be 
emphasmd that these two figures are used only as approximations to check assumptions and 
validate the NPVBreak-even analysis. 
2. W c h  Vehicles Should be Overhauied? 
The wide range of overhaul intervals suggests that the fleet should be evaluated on a 
vehicle-by-vehicle basis, based on annual mileage and the values of p and the LaPlace statistics, 
as calculated in Table 5.2. Such a table could be automated on a fleet-wide basis, and individual 
vehicles be nominated as candidates for overhaul/replace each year based on the highest values 
of these parameters. In other words, vehicles in the worst condition would be flagged, and 
feedback solicited from owning units regarding their actual condition. The unit commanders 
(owners) must have the final decision regarding their vehicles, since they are in the best position 
to know the actual usage, condition and need for overhaul; however, an automated list of vehicles 
meeting certain criteria would certainly be usefid for decision making at the Unit level. This 
process would allow expected program costs to be forecasted several years in advance. 
3. Observations About the Sample 
Ofthe 276 unique serial numbers in the sample, only 32 of them had enough recorded 
failure data available to be able to perform a reasonable trend analysis. It might be argued that 
a non-random sample may not reflect the entire fleet's reliability posture. In other words, these 
might simply be the 32 worst vehicles in the sample. This is probably not true. There are two 
responses; first, a significant amount of data was lost or not available during the period of Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, therefore a significant amount of failure data is missing. The Deployed 
Automated Support Centers used to process MIMMS transactions were not fidly operational until 
roughly six months into the deployment, and even after that period, many Marine Units did not 
report into the system due to long distances or lack of communication links with the DFASCs. 
secondly, as Chapter III discussed, there are some limitations in the MMhB-AIS reporting 
system that do not capture all of the potential failure data. ?he failure intervals used in the 
analysis were defined by the mileqqes associated with the EROs. Recall that only one mileage 
cmntly is recorded on the ERO, the mileage at failure, therefore failures that OCCUT while the 
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ERO is open are not captured in MIMMS. Sample statistics on the number of ERO days 
(measured f?om open to close dates) was distributed exponentially with a mean of 139 days. 
Many of these EROs reflected multiple failures. 
To support the statement that the 32 vehicles do reflect the sample population, a second 
measure of critical failure intervals is suggested. An alternate definition for a failure interval is 
the difference between when a part is received and when the next part, or a batch of parts is 
ordered. Presumably the next parts are ordered due to a subsequent failure, and it is more 
administratively convenient to order them using an El20 already open. ?his measure is suggested 
because many of the EROs fall into the category of being "perpetually" open, thus, data about 
when the failures occurred is lost. Assuming that critical parts are ordered roughly the same day 
that the system fails, and that they are applied the same day they are received, the time between 
orders might be a compromise solution to the data problem. The database used for this analysis 
consisted of records for 899 unique EROs; 324 of them had four or more %atchest' of parts 
odered under each ERO. That is, counters were used to total the number of records that had 
different order dates for batches of parts all recorded on the same ERO. Roughly one third of the 
EROs represented more than four system "failures" according to this alternative definition. 
Another argument is based on trends observed fiorn a fleet-wide perspective. A separate 
data file provided by the Reliability Analysis Center contained precalculated LaPlace trend test 
statistics (v) for vehicles fiom the three Regional Activity Centers, representing the entire fleet 
hhine Force. After screening out suspect values (based on not enough data available), a file 
containing 718 unique serial numbers fiom the most recent update cycle was analyzed ofthose 
serial numbers, 83% of them had values for U greater than zero, indicating that 83% of the sample 
exhibited increasing failure rates. The results are s- ' in Figure 5.5: 
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Figure 5.5 LaPlace Values for F2MF Sample 
Ofthe 718 vehicles shown in the sample above, 593 of the values are positive, indicating that the 
sample has an increasing failure rate. These results imply that the majority of the fleet of Marine 
Corps HMMWVs are in the deterioration phase. Therefore, one might conclude that the vehicle 
sample reflected by the 32 serial numbers used in this thesis is reflective of the Fleet Marine Force 
HMMWV status. 
4. Limitations 
The cost model shown in the spreadsheet is highly simplified, and certain assuIIIpfions 
would need to be refined For example, the annual maintenance costs after overhad were 
computed using the Army's usell life model, however it includes some costs which are not 
included in the do-nothing maintenance cost model. ,It was used as the best available data for 
illustrative purposes. Further, overhaul costs should also be refined and more data obtained prior 
to making decisions, since the NPV values and IRR are very sensitive to overhaul costs. 
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E SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a spreadsheet model that calculates pooled and individual values 
for the parameters of the ROCOF, whlch are used to forecast the expected number of failures of 
a sample set of 32 HMMWvs. The pooled MLE for p was roughly 1.6. therefore maintenance 
costs will increase at an increasing rate. Next, a cost spreadsheet was used to evaluate the 
decision alternatives using NPV and IRR analysis. The decision alternatives can be better 
evaluated knowing the probabilities associated with the forecast values, so Monte Carlo simulation 
was conducted using a spreadsheet add-in program called Crystal Ball. The Crystal Ball results 
indicated that the economic overhad period consisted of a range of values starting in 
approximately the year 1997 for the HMMWV fleet. Specific vehicles can be nominated for 
overhaul based on their condition which can be described by the values of p and the LaPlace test 
statistic 0. By calculating fleet-wide trend statistics, "blocks" of vehicles can be programmed 
for overhaul with several years lead-time. 
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k SUMMARY 
Economic overhaul or replacement intervals can be approximated based on adequate 
maintenance data. The necessary data elements needed to use the approach in this thesis are 
maintenance costs and failure times. If the pattern of time between failures indicates an increasing 
failure rate, then the maintenance costs will increase rapidly, as a hct ion of the failure intensity. 
The main variables affecting the replacemendoverhaul decision are the failure intensity and the 
cost. As the exponent (D of the ROCOF increases, deterioration occufs more rapidly and 
minimal rzpair costs escalate. Net present value analysis helps to identa the economic 
replacement period. In the case example in the last chapter, "PVs were calculated for scenarios 
that represented alternative overhaul options. The results of the NPV analysis indicated that the 
overhaul should be pedormed between 1997 and 2001. The main limitation of the approach is 
the validity of the failure data. However with adequate screening, the heuristic techniques 
presented in Chapter IU can eliminate the majority of the invalid data before the actual analysis 
is pedormed. 
The approach to estimating the ROCOF outlined in this thesis is repeatable, and lends 
itself to an automated process. With the exception of the overhaul costs and equipment inventory 
data (mandacturing date, fielding dates), all of the data was extracted through the maintenance 
management database. For the Marine Corps equipment, the MIMMS database is used, and for 
Army equipment, the TACOM Sample Data Collection can be used. The MIMMS data for the 
HMMWV was downloaded fkom mainfhme computer files, and all of the subsequent queries, 
computations and simulation were done with a spreadsheet program on a personal computer. 
Reliability theory can be effectively combined with cost analysis to assist with overhaul 
or replacement policy decisions. The Weibull intensity hction adequately describes the material 
condition of equipment, either on an individual or fleet-wide basis. From the failure intensity, 
simulation can be used to forecast expected failures over annual equivalent operating times, in 
order to estimate the associated costs of failures. Overhad or replacement decisions are analyzed 
using NPV, brealc-even and internal rate of return analysis to derive the policy decisions. The 
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model presented in this thesis is straightforward in that it is repeatable on a broad basis and lends 
itself to analysis of entire fleets of systems. By incorporating reliability theory into p r o m  cost 
decisions, the impacts of replacing or overhauling a type of system too early can be evaluated in 
more detail. and more economical decisions can be made. 
1. Design changes to the Maintenance Mimagement Information System 
Future design changes to the MIMMS-AIS or its next generation (PC ATLASS) should 
include a method for capturing meter readings at each fdilure, even if multiple failures OCCUT 
during the administrative life of the ERO. The ERO form itself presently allows only for input 
of the meter reading d restoration. Dhillon (1988) includes &e of f d h  as a crucial, yet basic 
element of failure data collection required for valid reliability analysis. A critical failure is 
defined as a condition in which the system became not operational or mission capable, due to the 
failure of a component. and the time of the failure event would have to be translated into 
straightforward terms applicable to data entry. This would be relatively simple to implement; it 
would involve recording the meter reading of the system when certain status change transactions 
are input. Maintenance status changes are already being routinely captured in MIMpI/Is-AIS. The 
additional input entry (meter reading) along with the status change transaction should not pose a 
significant burden on the maintenance shops. The cost of collecting the additional data should 
not be si@icant, since the mechanics or technicians working on the equipment usually have to 
physically record other maintenance tasks on the source documents. By mrd ing  the mileage at 
failure, the problems discussed in Chapter ID, i.e., long maintenance cycle times, multiple EROs, 
and single mileages at restomtion, would be solved. 
2. Mihtain Reliable Mhintemnce Data on Combat Essential Ecluipment 
Much like the US. A m y ' s  Sample Data Collection program, the Marine Corps should 
track a sample of specific principal end-items throughout their lifecycle. For combat critical 
equipment systems, called p i n g  items, a representative sample of them should be closely 
monitored through data reliability programs at selected units. Instead of archiving inactive 
maintenance data on these specified items, automated records should be centrally maintained for 
analysis such as the one presented in this thesis. The cost of data storage on a select sample 
w d d  not be as prohibitive as for the entjre inventory. 
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Ihe recommended list of items is contained in the current edition of the Marine Corps 
Bulletin 3000 series directives (MCl3ul3000, 1994). A sufficient number of principal end-items 
should be derived statistically for each separate system in the program. Unit maintenance shops 
that maintain the selected equipment would be provided with special instructions, and given 
incentives to report accurately on the equipment. In short, a representative sample of equipment, 
tracked throughout its life-cycle in a controlled data collection setting could alleviate some of the 
reporting difficulties presently experienced with analyzing raw MIMMS-AIS data. Better input 
data will lead to more conclusive results for program decisions. 
3. Track Equipment Scatus After Overhaul 
Depot level maintenance production is done in batches, and no centralized records are 
currently kept regarding specific item overhauled. Consequently, valid data does not exist except 
at the unit level, regarding the status of Manne Corps equipment after rebuild, ROAN or ESP. 
There is no way to measure the effects of overhaul on reliability or the extent of life extension 
without such data. It is recommended that the equipment identified for the "data reliability 
program'' described above also be specifically tracked after rebuild or ESPs are pedormed in order 
to measure the effectiveness of the overhaul program, In some cases the Army has found that 
vehicles were actually worse off after rebuild than before (Lee, Puzzuoli and Hoogtq, 1975). 
4. Periodic Status Reviews 
A periodic review of the principal end item described above should be conducted to 
validate program plans. The values of p and the Laplace statistic for the individual vehicles 
shown in Table 5.2 provide a qualitative description of the material condition of a sample of 
equipment systems. Such a table could be automated and generated for the entire fleet or for the 
controlled sample described above. Table 4.1 pvides  interpretations that can be used to quickly 
obtain a picture of the fleet based on the values of these two parameters. This approach quantifies 
measures of deterioration that are otherwise estimated by intuition. While it is not a substitute 
for good intuition, it is another element of information to support decision making. As the general 
trends of these values change, the data should be cornpad a@ alternative policies, on the 
basis of program priority and the essentiality of the combat system. 
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5. Evaluate Causes of Data Entry PmMems 
Further study should be done to identify problems with data entry. For example, accurate 
reporting may be too difficult in terms of busy shop operations. therefore short-cuts and work- 
arounds become the routine. A lack of user-friendliness or tedious input processing procedures 
may also be reasons for inaccurate data. Ongoing, quality training of maintenance management 
supervisors, shop supervisors and clerks should be emphasized at all Ievels. A Total Quality 
Leadership approach to improving the maintenance data input could be implemented at over the 
organizational spectrum fkom the small shop to the HQMC Maintenance Policy section level. 
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This Appendix provides the spreadsheet formulas used in Microsoft Excel to analyze the 
MIMPVIS-AIS data. Formulas are needed to convert certain data values, make to compansons 
between selected fields, or to flag specified criteria. The left column represents the spreadsheet 
column in which the field name appears, and is provided only as reference for the cell addresses 
described in the formulas. Data records appear as rows in the spreadsheet. Fields identified with 
a "Df indicate data fields compiled directly from the "raw" database. If the field is a data type, 
the field description and number of characters (n) is provided. All other fields are defined by a 
spreadsheet formula. Fields identified with a "C" stand for t'counterl' or computed value, and "L" 
stands for "logic" field. 
To use the formulas in the spreadsheet, the database is first read into a new spreadsheet. 
Columns are inserted into the database, as required The formulas are input into the first blank 
row under the header, and then copied down the entire range of rows containing data. 
A RAC D Alpha-numeric (6) Regional Activity Code 
B SERIAL# D Numeric(6) USMC Registration number of 
the vehicle 
c ERO D Alpha-numeric (5) Equipment Repair Order 
D M E T E R  D Numberic (10) Primary Meter Reading; 


























=IF(B2=B 1 ,IF(C2=C I ,  1,0),2) L 
U =IF(E2=1, 
C IF(Hl<H2,"LOOK", 1),0) 
D Numeric (5 )  
D Numeric ( 5 )  
D Numeric ( 5 )  
c =I2/10 




D E S r n W  
Compares the serial number and 
ERO number in previous record. 
"0" = both are same; I' 1 "= unique 
ERO, "2"= unique serial 
Checks if the next unique ERO 
was closed prior to an older ERO 
being closed. 
Date the ERO was opened. 
Date the ERO wits closed. 
Total direct labor hours expended 
on the ERO. 
Necessary conversion, due to 
decimal placement of 
MILABHRS. 
Date part was requisitioned. 
Date part was received at the 
unit. 
Julian date conversion to numeric 
value for subtraction or 
comparison of dates. 
Julian date conversion. 
11 I1  
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P RECDAY C =VALUE(RIGHT,L2,3)) 11 I 1  
Q & Q M G  C =IF(O2=M2,P2-N2,IF(O2= Used to subtract the order date of 
the part from the received date to M2+ 1 ), (( 365-N2)+P2), 
IF(02=M2+2),((365-N2)+P2), compute delivery delay time. 
IF(02= M2+3),((365- 
P2)+N3+365)))) 





between the received date of the 
current part and the order date to 
the next part. Could be a second 
measure of time between failures. 
S NEXTREQ C =IF(S2<= 1 ,R2," 'I) If the ANEXT REQ is negative, 
leave blank, else write the value 
of the difference in order days. 
Used to construct histogram. 
T PARTNAME D Character (19) 
U PARTSCHG D Numeric (11) 
v PCOSTS c =(u2*AA2)/100 
Description of the part being 
ordered. 
Cost of the part. 
Cost time quantity; and 
adjustment due to decimal 
placement of PARTSCHG. 




X EROCOST C =TF(E2=2,W, IF(E3>l,W, 
I t  ")) 
Y CUMLSEW C =IF(B2=B 1 ,V2+V1 ,V2) 
2 SER#COST C =IF(E3=2,Y2," 'I) 
AA Qn D Numeric (3) 
A B E C H  D Numeric(3) 
AC FAILCOUNT c =F(E32l,l,O) 
AD #FAILURES C =IF(E3=I,H2+1,1) 
DEScRIpIIcXv 
Shows ERO total parts costs 
adjacent only to the last record 
for each unique ERO number. 
Blank space otherwise. 
Accumulates parts costs for each 
unique serial number 
Shows vehicle total parts costs 
adjacent only to the last record 
for each unique serial number. 
Quantity of the part being 
ordered. 
Echelon of repairs; level of 
maintenance 
First step of a counter used to 
accumulate the number of critical 
failures recorded for a unique 
serial number. Value of "1" is a 
placeholder to start the count. 
Accumulates the number of 
failures for a serial number. 
* Syntax for the "IF" statement in Microsoft Excel is: "=IF(condition, then, else- ).'I Nested 
IF statements imply a boolean "AND" relationship for the criteria specified. 
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APPENDIX B. DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS 
A. GRAPHICALFAlLuREPL(N 
Chapter IV introduced the concept of trend testing in reliability analysis. Failure plotting 
is one of the methods described to evaluate the material condition of a complex repairable system. 
Figure k 1 provides a graphical representation of the trends in the failure patterns of the actual 
data presented in Chapter V. All 32 vehicle data sets are not shown, rather a sample of four 
representative HMMWV serial numbers to illustrate the general appearance of the curves. 
A' 
0 1  
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 
I Mlles 
.- 545199 - .  a.. . 545023 -A- 545131 - 545152 
Figure 4.1 Cirmdative Failure Mileage for FourHMMWVs 
(fourvehicle serial numbers m shown) 
B. SYSTEMFAILUREDATA 
?he data below represent to total time to system failure for each of the vehicles analyzed 
in the case study. It was obtained by identifying vehicles that had six or more recorded failures 
in the data sample. For each vehicle that met this criteria, their mileages were copied into the 
MLE estimation worksheet presented in the next section. 
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Serial numbers are bold followed by the mileages at failure: 
535199 535212 535393 537144 537290 537340 545191 537415 

























































9679 10379 1786 7900 15668 15470 3256 11764 
9707 12810 9105 14297 15670 17225 9374 17666 
10102 15488 9117 20054 17456 17225 16015 18170 
10135 21772 9195 22739 18476 19813 18779 27601 
13175 24767 9970 3 1053 18876 20129 23007 29330 
29756 24861 13445 34280 22454 20224 54632 31966 
30150 39725 22655 33330 
34092 35322 
545025 545066 545131 545143 545152 535200 545037 535204 
27835 4837 18134 8943 26566 13462 11002 21094 
28469 17370 19946 14446 27394 17603 11520 21099 
29 105 19239 21872 15182 30445 17603 12173 21261 
29173 20174 22418 16324 30571 18248 15897 23462 
29272 21038 22817 16479 31289 19709 19183 23453 
21038 26301 26294 17008 19820 27305 
32766 26301 30654 
535205 535209 535210 535211 536300 536493 537567 536504 
17030 12787 16184 12584 6458 9572 12417 9100 
18638 16691 16193 12383 9354 11468 14058 1288 
18846 19005 17234 13421 9393 12767 15376 12235 
19163 I9722 17695 14060 9950 13 193 16096 16753 
19269 21818 17989 16901 10274 14428 16402 17002 




537384 537400 537497 
17763 19801 14306 
19670 20000 1689 1 
24108 24039 17738 
24733 25163 17935 
24797 26742 18510 
27009 
The next page contains an extract of the MLE estimation worksheet used to for the data 
shown above. Prior to copymg the TISF, data into the MLE worksheet. the TISF,s were sorted 
in ascending order to properly reflect mileages that increase. Reasons for the data being in non- 
sorted sequence stems from the fact that the source da tahe  was sorted by serial number, then 
date-received-in-shop, then date closed, prior to the analysis. For this reason, some of the 
mileages appear out of sequence in the raw data. 
Subtotals for the various columns appear below the cells for each serial number, grand 
totals for the subtotal rows appear in the upper left comer of the spreadsheet. Values for the 
individual vehicle MLEs p and h as well as the LaPlace test statistic based on equations (2-12), 
(2-13) and (2-9), respectively appear in the boxes for each system The pooled MLEs appear in 
the box at the top of the spreadsheet, and are based on equations (2-12) and (2-13). Only 
calculations for the first two vehicles are shown. 
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'This page is intentionally left blank 
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,E Nq: LCL UCL 
X In(TTSFi) 1879.54 p hat: 1.597 1.393 1.812 
Z TTSFiAp 3.1 5E+08 1 hat: 4.99E07 4.35507 5.7E-07 









































i h(TISFdTTSFI) In(TTSFi) TTSFiAp 
9.658 4975029 
1 1.354 9.753 5792767 
1 0.813 9.817 6407761 
1 0.448 9.879 7082681 
1 0.447 9.880 7084419 
1 0.180 9.939 7783742 




















i wTisFnllTsFI) In(TTSFi) 
9.199 
1 1.255 9394 
1 1.114 9420 
1 1.244 9.396 
1 0.325 9633 
1 0.207 9676 







51 2201 0 
5855215 
10 
X(Ni) 6 6 
X In(lTSFnITrSFi) 3.242 4.145 
X In(l-rSFi) 68.91 66.48 
X TFSFPp 8391685 585521 5 
**  3 I Additional "boxes" for the system coinputations appear on the rest of the spreadslieel -> 
The following pages contain the simulation output generated by the "Crystal Ball" 
s o h e .  ?he msumption cells are i n p ~  variables that represent the costs, mileage and labor hour 




Forecast: NPV Do-nothing cost-stream over 14 year period 
Summary: 
Display Range is from -800,000 to 0 
Entire Range is from -2,902,079 to - 1,862 





























Forecast: NPV Do nothing 
i Cell 834 Frequency Chart 974 Trials Show 
i . I 9 2  i , I. 187 
I 











Forecast: NPV 1994 plan 
Summary: 
Display Range is from - 1 10,000 to -20,000 
Entire Range is from -138,080 to -27,503 






























, Cell 838 Frequency Chart 974 Trials Shown ~ 
I Forecast: NPV 1994 plan I 
i .036 35 











Forecast: NFV 1996 plan 
Summary: 
Display Range is from - 100,000 to -30,000 
Entire Range is from - 1 12,6 17 to -3 1,256 






























i Cell 842 
Forecast: NPV 1996 plan 
Frequency Chart 990 Trials Shown I 
.039 r - 39 
-82,500 -65,000 -47.500 -3&000 
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Forecast: NPV 1997 plan 
Summary: 
Display Range is from -85.000 to -30,000 
Entire Range is from -102.161 to -33,339 





























I I Forecast: NPV 1997 plan i 
~ ! Cell 846 Frequency Chart 974 Trials Shown I 
.035 _1 - 34 1 
-71,250 -57,500 -43,750 -30,000 I 
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Forecast: Optimum Overhaul Interval (miles) 
S urn m ary : 
Display Range is from 0 to 450,000 
Entire Range is from 19,340 to 846,974 





























Forecast: Optimum Overhaul lntenral ~ 
I Cell H5 Frequency Chart 971 Trials Shown I 
.a43 . 42 
I 
112,500 225.000 337.500 
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Forecast: Life Expectancy (from present) 
Summary: 
Display Range is from 4.0 to 14.0 
Entire Range is from 4.5 to 24.7 





























I , Forecast: Life Expectancy (from present) 
~ 
Cell H8 Frequency Chart 985 Trials Shown I I 
.040 - 39 
4.6 6.5 9.0 11.5 14.0 
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Assumptions About Input Variables 
Assumption: Annual Mileage 
Lognormal distribution with parameters: 
Mean 6,970 
Standard Dev. 7,650 
Selected range is from 500 to 25,000 
Mean value in simulation was 5,882 
Annual Mileage 
326 17,147 33,968 50,788 67,609 
Assumption: CM Cost Per ERO 




Selected range is from $50.00 to $2,379.00 
Mean value in simulation was $1,128.26 
U Cod Pw ERO 
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Assumption: Labor Hours/ERO 




Selected range is from 1.00 to 16.60 





1 .oo 4.90 8.80 12.70 16.60 
Assumption: Sched Maint Costs 




Selected range is from $60.00 to $100.00 
Mean value in simulation was $80.42 
Schd Milnt Coab 
590.00 $lW.OO $8O.W 570.00 $80.00 
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Assumption: Sched PM labor hours 
Lognormal distribution with parameters: 
Mean i.81 
Standard Dev. 1.45 
Selected range is from i .OO to i 1 .OO 
Mean value in simulation was 2.32 
%hod PM labor hours 
0.17 3.05 5.92 8.80 11.68 
Assumption: Hourly Wage Rate 




Selected range is from $10.29 to $14.46 
Mean value in simulation was $12.16 




$10.29 911.33 912.38 $13.42 $14.46 
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Assumption: b hat 




Selected range is from 1.39 to 1.8 1 
Mean value in simulation was 1.60 
b hat 
1.39 1.50 1.60 1.71 1.81 
Assumption: Overhaul Cost 
Uniform distribution with parameters: 
Minimum $23,400 
Maximum $30,600 





023,400 $25.200 $27.000 028,800 030.600 
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APPENDIX C PAREX0 ANALYSIS OF PAKIS USAGE 
This Appendix provides the results of the Pareto analysis of the HMMWV parts usage for 
the entire database sample. Only the first 55 items are shown, the remaining parts consists of less 
than 0.3% of the total usage over the 54 month sample period. Percentages reflect parts usage, 
i.e., as a percentage of the total demand quantity, not costs. 
'Ihe purpose of the Pareto analysis was to establish that the HMMWV is a sufficiently 
complex system, such that no single item contributes to the majority of the system failures. In 
the author's opinion, the one questionable item (glow plugs) that amounts to sixteen percent of the 
total usage was most likely attributable to Operation Desert Storm. The sandy, dusty environment, 
coupled with the fact that JP-5 aviation fuel was used in the HMMWVs caused widespread fuel 
injector clogging. Many Marine units began replacing fuel injectors on a preventative basis. The 
fuel injector problem was mainly isolated to Desert Storm usage. 
?he low percentages for the remaining parts indicates that none of the rest of the parts 
contribute to a significant mount of the usage, therefore it is assumed that the HMMWV is 
sufficiently complex to use the model presented in this thesis. 
PART NAME TOTAL COST %USAGE CUML % QTY 
Total Sum of PARTCOST $761,926 728 1 
GLOW PLUG 768.40 16.26% 16.26% 1184A 
W , I " D E s c E N T  
TRE9PNElJMAllC 
BA'ITERY,STORAGE 
DISK BRAKE SHOE 
PARTS KIT,BALL JOIN 
PACKING,PREFORhED 






PARTS KIT,HAND BR4K 
4,343.35 







































PART NAME TOTAL COST % USAGE CUML Yo QTY 
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